





INDUSTRY COMPETITION AND  











A THESIS SUBMITTED 
FOR THE DEGREE OF PH.D. OF FINANCE 
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE 







I hereby declare that this thesis is my original work and it has been written by me 
in its entirety. I have duly acknowledged all the sources of information which 
have been used in the thesis. 


















I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my supervisor, Professor 
Anand Srinivasan, for his guidance and support throughout the course of my Ph.D. 
study. This thesis would not have been possible without his help and 
encouragement. I am also grateful to my thesis committee members, Professor 
Yongheng Deng, Professor Sumit Agarwal, and Professor David Reeb. The 
constructive comments and insightful feedbacks from them have improved the 
quality of this thesis substantially. 
My heartfelt thanks also go to many of my seniors in the Ph.D. program, Dr. 
He Wen, Dr. Shen Jianfeng, Dr. Li Yan and Dr. Lin Chunmei, etc, who have 
offered kind help to me in various occasions. Especially I would like to thank Dr. 
He Wen, who have discussed interesting research ideas with me, and worked 
together with me on several research projects. I also thank my fellow Ph.D. 
classmates, including Cheng Si, Wang Tao and Lu Ruichang, whose 
companionships made the Ph.D. journey much more delightful. 
I am also indebted to my family for their unconditional love and support. Last 
but not least, I would like to thank everybody who helped me during the past five 
years of my PhD study, and to express my apology for not being able to thank 
each one of you here individually.  
ii 
 
Table of Contents 
 
Acknowledgements .................................................................................................. i 
Summary ................................................................................................................ iii 
List of Tables ......................................................................................................... iv 
1. Introduction ......................................................................................................... 1 
2. Literature Review.............................................................................................. 10 
3. Hypothesis Development .................................................................................. 15 
4. Data and Measures ............................................................................................ 18 
5. Empirical Results .............................................................................................. 23 
5.1 Summary Statistics and Univariate Tests .................................................... 23 
5.2 Multivariate Regression Results ................................................................. 26 
5.2.1 Effect of Lines of Credit on Firm Profit ............................................... 26 
5.2.2 Industry Usage of Lines of Credit ........................................................ 28 
5.2.3 Loan Contract Terms ............................................................................ 29 
6. Robustness Check ............................................................................................. 32 
6.1 Firm Profit Regression: Instrumental Variable Approach .......................... 32 
6.2 Natural Experiment Using Tariff Rate Reduction....................................... 33 
7. Conclusion ........................................................................................................ 37 
References ............................................................................................................. 39 







Motivated by a debate on the effect of debt on firms’ product market performance, 
I examine the impact of lines of credit on firms’ future profits. Consistent with the 
notion that lines of credit provide firms with unique financial flexibility and 
enhance their strategic position within the industry, I find supportive evidence that 
acquisition of lines of credit increases firms’ future profit. In particular, this 
value-enhancing effect is more pronounced in more competitive industries. 
Besides, this paper also studies firms’ strategic usage of lines of credit under a 
competitive market. Results reveal that in more competitive industries, fewer lines 
of credit are acquired on per firm basis, both in terms of number and dollar 
amount of lines of credit acquired, although aggregate industry usage is higher. 
Moreover, lines of credit carry less favorable contract terms when the borrowing 
firms are from more competitive industries, in terms of higher loan rate, lower 
loan amount and more stringent collateral requirement. 
To ensure the robustness of the results, instrument variable analysis and natural 
experiments are employed to ameliorate endogeneity concerns. Overall, this study 
supports the view that lines of credit enhance firm value and induce firms 
compete more aggressively in the product market. It also highlights the role of 
product market competition plays in influencing the usage and contract terms of 
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Bank lines of credit, or revolving credit agreements, account for a large 
portion of debt instruments for public firms in the United States. Kashyap, Rajan, 
and Stein (2002) report that 70% of bank borrowings by U.S. small firms is in the 
form of credit lines. Sufi (2009) also documents that over 80 percent of bank 
financing extended to public firms is through lines of credit, and unused lines of 
credit on corporate balance sheets represent 10 percent of total assets. Extensive 
research has been conducted on the theoretical foundation for the existence of 
lines of credit and related empirical implications1. Although there are several 
studies on the usage of bank lines of credit at individual firm level, little work has 
been done to examine the impact of industrial market structure, in particular, the 
level of competition at the industry level on the usage or the pricing of lines of 
credit.  
There are a number of potential reasons why the study of lines of credit and 
industry competition is important. Firms reside within the framework of an 
industry, and they formulate operating decisions that arise from the equilibrium in 
the product market which potentially reflects strategic interactions among market 
participants. Therefore, industry structure may affect the operating and financing 
strategies that firms employ, which in turn may affect firm value and strategic 
                                                 
1. Examples of articles that discuss the theoretical foundations of lines of credit include 
Berkovitch and Greenbaum (1991), Boot, Thakor, and Udell (1987), Duan and Yoon (1993), 
Holmstrom and Tirole (1998), Maksimovic (1990), Martin and Santomero (1997), Morgan (1994), 
and Shockley and Thakor (1997) amongst others. See Agarwal, Chomsisengphet, and Driscoll 
(2004); Rauh and Sufi (2005); Jiménez, Lopez and Saurina (2009); Ivashina & Scharfstein (2008); 
Campello, Giambona, Graham and Harvey (2011) amongst others for a list of recent empirical 
papers on bank lines of credit. 
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position within the industry. Further, given the additional financial flexibility 
offered by lines of credit (Maksimovic, 1990), it is an especially intriguing 
question how firms take advantage of the additional financial support and 
strategically operate in a competitive product market. In particular, if lines of 
credit improve the efficiency of firms that acquire them by enabling management 
to take investment projects with higher return or formulating better operating 
decisions, the follow up questions would be how it would be reflected on 
operating performance, and moreover whether the competitive landscape of the 
industry  plays any role in the process. 
Subsequently, I draw upon this prior background and describe three testable 
hypotheses, followed by the elaboration on the empirical tests for each of them. 
The first hypothesis I put forward is on the effect of lines of credit on firms’ profit 
in a competitive product market. There is a number of empirical evidence 
demonstrating that too much leverage leads to higher distress risk and lower firm 
performance in the product market, although there is also another view which 
argues that higher leverage leads to more aggressive competition, and urges firms 
to make more efficient corporate decisions, in the sense of Brander and Lewis 
(1990). To provide further evidence on this issue, I take a unique perspective by 
studying bank lines of credit and its effect on the borrowing firm’s performance, 
especially under a competitive market environment. Since lines of credit can 
provide firms with additional financial flexibility, compared with general debt, 
firms’ strategic use of lines of credit in competitive industries is expected to be 
different from that of the general debt.  
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Given the unique feature of lines of credit, it is generally believed that they 
would be more likely to make firms compete more aggressively and lead to higher 
firm value, instead of falling prey to rivals’ predation. Maksimovic (1990) posits 
that lines of credit may enable firms to compete more aggressively in the product 
market. Similarly, Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) show that financially powerful 
firms could adopt aggressive competitive strategies that could increase the 
business risk of financial vulnerable incumbent firms substantially. Taken 
together, the baseline effect of lines of credit is that lines of credit could enhance 
the profit of a borrowing firm operating in an imperfectly competitive industry.  
Further to this baseline effect, I examine the varying degree of lines of 
credit’s value-enhancing effect under different industry competition. In more 
competitive industries, firms constantly need to face the competitive threat from 
their rivals. The need for financial flexibility is more urgent, as intense 
competition exacerbates firms’ cash flow pressure, and leads to higher default risk. 
Based on this rationale, I hypothesize that the profit enhancing effect of lines of 
credit should be more pronounced in more competitive markets.  
The previous hypothesis examines the impact of lines of credit on firms’ 
future profit in the competitive product market. Next I study how industry 
competition influences firms’ usage of lines of credit. Given that lines of credit 
deliver more value-enhancing benefit under more competitive circumstances, it is 
anticipated that firms in more competitive industries might actually make more 
use of lines of credit. This follows from the two facts: (a) the need for easy access 
to credit is more important in more competitive industries; and (b) the potential 
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for competitors to strategically exploit their lines of credit if the subject-firm 
obtains one. However, as my sample only includes loans that have been approved 
by banks, the actual level of loan demand could not be observed in the pool of 
granted loans. The equilibrium outcome of the two forces, i.e., loan demand from 
borrowers and credit supply by lenders, determines the optimal level of lines of 
credit usage activity. If banks restrain credit supply to certain markets, in 
particular, the more competitive industries, firms in those industries might not 
acquire more lines of credit ex post, although having higher demand. 
Besides lines of credit usage intensity, I also examine the impact of 
competition on the terms of lines of credit contracts. I hypothesize that lines of 
credit contracts carry less favorable terms in more competitive industries, 
including both the price terms (loan rate) and non-price terms (loan amount and 
collateral requirement). To be specific, I examine whether product market 
competition increases the cost of lines of credit which translates into higher loan 
rate. To discourage excessive risk taking of borrowers, I would expect banks to 
exert more stringent collateral requirement onto the lines of credit extended to 
firms in more competitive industries. In addition, in order to limit the amount of 
risk exposure to any single industry, banks may ration the credit granted to 
borrowing firms in that industry if the demand for credit is higher than the 
intended total credit supply. In light of this rationale, I hypothesize that the 
facility amount of the lines of credit would be smaller for firms in those industries. 
To test these hypotheses described above empirically, I first collect data on 
loans extended to all U.S. publicly listed firms from Loan Pricing Corporation 
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(LPC)’s DealScan database, where loan pricing and loan utilization related 
variables are obtained. The loan sample starts in 1986 and ends in 2008. I use the 
“all in spread drawn” from this database as a measure of the cost of loan, which is 
defined in basis points above 6-month LIBOR. I define industry membership 
using three-digit SIC classification, following the recent studies such as Hou & 
Robinson (2006) and Ali et al (2009). I construct the Herfindahl index (HHI) to 
proxy for three-digit SIC industry concentration based on the Compustat data and 
obtain the total number and total dollar amount of loans in the three-digit SIC 
industry as proxies for the intensity of usage of lines of credit by firms in an 
industry. I ensure robustness to the definitions of industry concentration by 
employing two alternative proxies, including the Fitted HHI proposed in Hoberg 
and Phillips (2010), and CR4 which is the total market share of the biggest four 
firms in each three-digit SIC industry. 
My empirical evidence offers interesting insight on the research questions. To 
begin with, for the hypothesis on the value-enhancing role of lines of credit in 
competitive industries, I find that acquisition of lines of credit leads to better 
future profit for the borrowing firms. Specifically, acquiring a line of credit in the 
current year leads to about 1.3% increase in profit in the subsequent year after the 
loan. Further, this value-enhancing role of lines of credit becomes more 
pronounced in more competitive industries.  
Next, on the usage of lines of credit, the result reveals that firms in more 
competitive industries tend to acquire fewer lines of credit on per firm basis, 
although aggregate industry acquisition is higher in those industries. The observed 
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acquisition and usage of lines of credit by borrowing firms is a manifestation of 
the balance between the firms’ loan demand of and banks’ credit supply. If the 
supply side effect overrides the demand side, although firms apply for more lines 
of credit in more competitive market, banks may curb supply to certain industry 
due to several reasons. First, there is certain guidance associated with credit 
concentration on single-counterparty or a group of related counterparties. As a 
consequence, banks might refrain from extending too much credit supply to a 
single industry for regulatory concerns. Second, for diversification purpose, banks 
may optimize their risk exposure by lending broadly to a combination of 
industries and minimize the possibility of large losses due to concentration risk. 
This observation that there is a lower intensity of lines of credit usage in more 
competitive markets suggests the supply side effect dominates the demand side 
effect. That is, banks exercise stricter screening before lending to firms from 
highly competitive industries, although facing higher demand for credit from 
those industries.  
Besides pre-lending screening, another plausible channel for banks to impose 
stricter restrictions is through loan contract. I then examine the detailed terms in 
these lines of credit contracts, to ascertain whether the supply side plays a role in 
influencing the usage of lines of credit, especially when the borrowing firms are 
regarded as having higher competition risk. I find that industry competition 
increases the price of loans and the likelihood of non-price term restrictions. For 
example, the regression results indicate 1% increase in HHI leads to over 40 basis 
points increase in interest rate charged on lines of credit. I also find loan contract 
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in general becomes less favorable in terms of more stringent collateral 
requirement and smaller loan amount, when the borrowers are from more 
competitive industries. The observation that lines of credit are more expensive 
and carry less favorable contract terms offers a plausible explanation for the 
earlier finding that firms in more competitive industries use fewer lines of credit 
on per firm basis in more competitive industries, implying lenders exercise more 
caution when offering loans to these firms, and might limit credit supply to highly 
competitive industries through credit rationing and price discrimination. 
In addition to the above analysis, I also take steps to conduct further 
robustness check of my main results. In order to ameliorate endogeneity concern 
that firms with more profitable projects in the future tend to acquire more lines of 
credit in the current year, I redo the profit regression using instrumental variable 
approach, I choose the “lending relationship” as an instrument variable for the 
usage of lines of credit. It is defined as the proportion of total amount of 
relationship loans out of the total amount of all types of loans taken by the 
borrower in past 3 years. It is documented in the literature that stronger lending 
relationship is associated with higher amount loans acquired and more favorable 
loan contract terms (Bharath et al, 2011). The idea behind this instrument variable 
is that lending relationship correlates with number of lines of credit acquired but 
does not correlate with firms’ profit directly. I find that after adjusting for the 
endogeneity, acquiring a line of credit still leads to better profit next year, 
confirming my result in the baseline analysis. 
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In a next step, I employ a unique quasi-natural experiment as another 
robustness check. The rationale is that a large tariff reduction usually results in 
intensified competition due to unexpected penetration of foreign firms. The 
results from this robustness check lend supports to my main hypotheses. Using 
tariff rate reductions as a proxy for a sudden increase in the competitive pressure 
that firms face (exogenous competitive shock), the results show that these 
reductions in import tariff rates are associated with decrease in terms of lines of 
usage per firm, and also more onerous loan contract terms. I also find that after a 
large tariff reduction, the value enhancing role of lines of credit is more 
pronounced, consistent with my earlier results. 
Overall, this paper contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, it 
adds to a larger literature that links industrial organization to firms’ financing 
behavior. Earlier work such as Titman (1984) studies how capital structure and 
product markets interact through the liquidation decision. There are also some 
other works that link industrial organization with firms’ capital market 
characteristics. For example, Hou and Robinson (2006) find that firms in more 
concentrated industries have lower stock market returns. However, this paper 
focuses only on the equity market, and does not indicate how competition 
influences debt-financing decisions. There is only limited empirical evidence on 
the effect of industry organization on firms’ debt financing behaviors, especially 
on the usage and pricing of bank lines of credit. To my knowledge, this paper is 
the first to provide empirical evidence on how the competition in the product 
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market affects firms’ strategic use of bank lines of credit, the contract terms of 
these bank lines of credit, and their unique role in enhancing firm value. 
Second, this paper also sheds new light on understanding the cost and benefit 
of lines of credit under different competitive environments. My result underlines 
the importance of lines of credit in providing liquidity and flexibility for firms in 
competitive industries. The value enhancing effect of lines of credit accentuates in 
more competitive industries, providing implications for firms’ strategic usage of 
lines of credit and liquidity management. 
Furthermore, this paper extends the prior studies on industry competition and 
cost of debt and the use of non-price debt-terms. Valta (2012) documents that 
competition significantly increases the cost of bank debt. However, he only 
studies the price dimension of all bank loans (including lines of credit), and 
ignores other non-price terms. My paper provides evidence that the intensity of 
competition shapes non-price terms of bank loans, including loan collateral and 
loan amount, with a special focus on bank lines of credit. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the 
literature. Section 3 discusses hypothesis formulation. Section 4 describes the data 
and sample construction. Section 5 discusses the empirical result for each of the 
hypotheses; and Section 6 further strengthens the main findings by several 




2. Literature Review 
There are two opposite views on the effect of debt on firms’ product market 
performance. While extensive empirical evidence documents that excessive 
leverage leads to lower firm performance in the product market, there is also 
another argument that higher leverage leads to more aggressive competition, in 
the sense of Brander and Lewis (1990). This view holds that higher leverage 
drives firms to compete more aggressively in the product market. That is, higher 
leverage leads to higher distress risk, and this can motivate firms to make more 
value-maximizing decisions, which leads to more aggressive action in the product 
market. Brander and Lewis (1986) is one of the first few papers on the 
relationship between firms’ financing decision and product market performance. 
A theoretical model is constructed in this paper whereby leverage is shown to lead 
to more aggressive competition in the product market. They argue that as a firm 
takes on more debt, it has incentive to pursue risky strategies that raise returns in 
good states but has lower return in bad state. 
Another strand of literature argues that debt makes firms more vulnerable to 
rivals’ predations. Theoretically, Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) demonstrate that 
debt financing can make firms weaker in competition, and may lead to poor 
performance of the firm. Empirically, Opler and Titman (1994) show that higher 
leverage leads to lower market share, as more levered firms will have higher risk 
of financial distress, and the weakened condition of these high debt firms induces 
an aggressive response by competitors. Taking advantage of the vulnerable high 
debt firms, competitors tend to make strategic effort to drive out them and 
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consequently gain more market share. Chevalier (1995) shows that increases in 
leverage tend to soften competition, based on the evidence from the supermarket 
industry. She documents that supermarkets are more likely to enter and expand in 
markets if a large proportion of market incumbents have recently gone through a 
LBO, which shows a negative relationship between leverage and competition. 
To further ascertain the debate whether higher level of leverage leads to 
better firm performance, I take a unique perspective by focusing on lines of credit. 
Specifically, I study empirically the effect of lines of credit on firm’s future 
operating performance. I argue that the effect of lines of credit on firms’ 
performance might be different from general debt, due to their unique features. A 
line of credit, also referred to as a loan commitment or a revolving credit facility, 
provides a firm with a nominal amount of debt capacity against which the firm 
draws funds.  It is essentially a forward contract issued to provide financing under 
the specified terms allowing a firm to borrow as much of the prefixed line as 
needed over a specified time interval.  
Maksimovic (1990) is one of the first few studies that theoretically examine 
industry effect on firms’ financing decisions, with a special focus on bank lines of 
credit. His model posits that the unique financial flexibility provided by lines of 
credit enables firms to strategically compete in the imperfectly competitive 
product market and increases firm value. The rationale of this argument is that 
lines of credit are valuable to firms because they permit the firms to threaten to 
expand production than they otherwise would in response to the rival's output 
decision. Since industry competition tends to intensify as the number of 
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competitors increases and as the firms become more equal in size and capability, 
acquiring a lines of credit could improve the firm's strategic position within an 
industry by sending a signal to the market and posing a threat to its competitors. 
The threat is credible with the support of a line of credit because the loan contract 
commits the bank to provide financing on terms which subsidize the firm in 
carrying out its threat.  
Hence it is perceived as being flexible and convenient for the borrowers 
(Martin and Santomero 1997) and is generally used to provide working capital 
(Berger and Udell 1998). Given the unique feature of lines of credit, I argue that 
lines of credit will be more likely to make firms compete more aggressively, 
instead of falling prey to rivals’ predation. 
Empirical evidence on the benefits of lines of credit has largely focused on 
documenting these benefits to the borrowing firms. According to the existing 
literature, lines of credit provide financial flexibility and serve as a hedging tool to 
safeguard firms against deterioration of external financing conditions. For 
example, Campello, Giambona, Graham and Harvey (2010) find that lines of 
credit are associated with greater spending when companies are not cash-strapped. 
Firms with limited access to credit lines, on the other hand, appear to choose 
between savings and investing during the crisis. Their evidence indicates that 
credit lines could ease the impact of the financial crisis on corporate spending. 
Based on their survey evidence, Campello, Graham and Harvey (2010) show that 
constrained firms plan deeper cuts in tech spending, employment, and capital 
spending. Constrained firms also burn through more cash, draw more heavily on 
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lines of credit for fear banks would restrict access in the future, and sell more 
assets to fund their operations. The reason is that these types of borrowers are 
most likely to be rationed when their lenders are having their own problems. 
There is extensive literature on individual firms’ use of lines of credit, the 
related agency problem and other firm level characteristics related to the 
origination and drawn-downs of lines of credit, both empirically and theoretically. 
Using a sample of public U.S. firms from 1996 to 2003, Sufi (2009) finds that 
credit line access and use are influenced by firm profitability, industry, age, and 
size. Martin and Santomero (1997)’s model provides the intuition for the 
existence of  bank lines of credit from another perspective, whereby it assumes 
that firms desire speed and secrecy in pursuing investment opportunities. Given 
the need for speed and secrecy, their model postulates that lines of credit are 
optimal relative to other forms of debt, and explores the types of firms that will be 
more likely to use lines of credit.  
Few studies examine the benefits of bank lines of credit in the context of 
firms’ product market. I argue that since an industry is a group of firms that 
market products which are close substitutes for each other, and each of the firms 
strives to compete with each other for market share (Porter, 1998), firms take into 
consideration of industry competition before they make production and financing 
decisions. They respond to competitive moves of other industry players. As lines 
of credit are a prevalent form of financing by US firms (Kashyap, Rajan, and 
Stein 2002; Sufi 2009), it is thus of primary importance to understand the benefit 
they provide to firms in a competitive product market.  
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Along this line, Valta (2012) finds that the cost of bank debt is systematically 
higher for firms that operate in competitive product markets. He argues that the 
reason might be that banks price financial contracts by taking into account the risk 
that arises from product market competition. However, he only focus on the price 
dimension of general bank loans, and ignores the non-price terms. A related 
consideration is how competition influences the cost of a line of credit. In this 
paper, I would like to reexamine and extend his findings. I attempt to show that 
the effect of industry competitiveness on loan spread of general bank loans as 
documented in Valta (2012) still holds for bank lines of credit, which is one 
special type of loans. I also extend his finding to a more complete set of loan 
contract terms, i.e., collateral requirement and loan amount. 
This paper also draws inference from the banking regulations and policies. 
Excessive funding concentration might lead to additional risk, when a bank is 
particularly reliant on a narrow segment of the market as a source of finance. By 
definition, risk concentrations may be caused by material concentrations of 
exposure to individual names as well as large exposures to a single sector 
(geographic region or industry). Basel Committee on Banking Supervision states 
“The supervisor determines that banks have adequate policies and processes to 
identify, measure, evaluate, monitor, report and control or mitigate concentrations 
of risk on a timely basis.”2 In order to comply with these banking regulations, 
banks have to control the amount of risk exposure to any single industry sector. 
Hence, supply side effect indeed plays an important role in shaping up the credit 
                                                 
2
 Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision, standards published by the Committee in 
September 2012, are accessible at www.bis.org/publ/bcbs230.pdf. 
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usage of industrial firms. My analysis results imply pre-lending, banks limit credit 
supply to more competitive industries. And post-lending, banks set loan contract 
terms strategically to mitigate credit exposure concern. 
 
3. Hypothesis Development 
Lines of credit avail the borrowing firms with lower funding cost in the future. 
It is documented widely in the literature that lines of credit could be used by firms 
in imperfectly competitive industries to improve market power and enhance firm 
value. As shown in Maksimovic (1990), bank lines of credit are a valuable 
financing device to the borrowing firms because they permit the borrowing firms 
to make credible signal to the market to produce a greater quantity than it 
otherwise would in response to the rival firms’ output decision and hence improve 
the firm's strategic position. In essence, the model posits that the key benefit of 
obtaining a line of credit is that it allows the firm a lower cost of credit in the 
future, in return for an upfront fee. Thus, a firm getting a line of credit is 
equivalent to a lower marginal cost of production, which commits the firm to 
competing more aggressively in the product market.  
Drawing upon this baseline implication, I investigate further how this value 
enhancing role of lines of credit evolves in different industry environments, by 
examining the interaction effect with industry competition. On the one hand, in 
certain industries, for example, the more competitive industries which are 
relatively young and still at the growing stage, the cost of lines of credit might be 
16 
 
higher as the industry players are considerably riskier and more speculative in 
nature, compared with the more established and mature firms in less competitive 
industries which attain stable revenue stream. Ex ante, taking into consideration 
the additional risk that arises from product market competition, banks might 
charge higher loan rate and impose tighter restrictions on non-price dimensions 
when loans are granted to those firms.  
On the other hand, the benefit derived from having access to funding via lines 
of credit could also be higher at the same time. The financial flexibility offered by 
lines of credit could be more valuable in the more competitive industries, where 
there are constant competitive threats from rival firms in the industry. Expenses 
are likely to be very large during these industries as the firms spend a lot on 
marketing and research. Under these circumstances, bank lines of credit play a 
more important role for these firms as they have fewer other options of external 
financing while facing turbulent market condition and tough industry competition. 
The funding provided by lines of credit at a lower cost enables the borrowing 
firms to exploit their investment opportunities fully, and protect them from the 
risk of losing market share to industry rivals. 
Taking both the cost and benefit of lines of credit into account, it becomes a 
question whether bank lines of credit enhance firm profit to a greater extent in 
more competitive industry. I hypothesize that if the benefit of lines of credit 
outweighs cost, having access to lines of credit would create extra value for the 
borrowing firms in those industries. This leads to the first hypothesis below. 
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Hypothesis 1: If the benefit of lines of credit outweighs the cost in more 
competitive markets, the profit enhancing effect of lines of credit would be more 
pronounced in those industries. The opposite holds if the cost is greater than the 
benefit. 
As shown in Bolton and Scharfstein (1990), stronger firms could make 
strategic efforts to drive out other relatively weaker incumbent firms by adopting 
aggressive competitive strategies to significantly increase the business risk of 
those incumbent firms. As a result, there is greater need for financial flexibility 
and readily accessible funds through lines of credit by the weaker incumbent 
firms in the competitive industries. Having access to lines of credit, firms are 
equipped with additional financial flexibility and would compete more 
aggressively in the product market, ceteris paribus. 
Based on the above argument, I conjecture that industry competition should 
be positively related to usage of lines of credit. This leads to the hypothesis 2 in 
this study. 
Hypothesis 2: Firms acquire more bank lines of credit in more competitive 
industries. 
 
The next hypothesis examines the relationship between contract terms 
imposed on the lines of credit and industry competition. The basic intuition of this 
hypothesis is the competition intensity of the industry might have an adverse 
effect on firms’ ability to maintain its solvency. The likelihood that firms default 
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on their interest payments might be higher in more competitive market. Also the 
competitive landscape of the product market could affect the number and the 
financial strength of potential buyers and hence the asset liquidity of an industry 
(Ortiz-Molina and Phillips 2011). Ex ante, banks take into account the 
competition risk faced by the firms in more competitive industry, and require 
higher interest rate as a compensation for higher competition risk involved. 
Likewise, the other terms in the contract are also expected to be more stringent, 
namely, higher likelihood of collateral requirement and smaller loan amount 
granted. Henceforth, the third hypothesis is as follows. 
Hypothesis 3: The contract terms on bank lines of credit are less favorable in 
more competitive market (higher interest rate charged, higher likelihood of 
collateral requirement and smaller loan amount granted). 
 
4. Data and Measures 
The corporate loan sample in this study is from LPC’s DealScan database. 
LPC has been collecting information on loans to large U.S. corporations primarily 
through self-reporting by lenders, SEC filings, and its staff reporters. The primary 
sources of data for DealScan are attachments on SEC filings, reports from loan 
originators, and the financial press. This database contains detailed information 
about commercial (primarily syndicated) loans made to U.S. and foreign 
corporations, with data from about the mid-1980s (albeit with thin coverage) to 
2007. According to Carey and Hrycray (1999), the DealScan database covers 
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between 50% and 75% (by value) of all commercial loans in the U.S during the 
early 1990s and the “large majority” of sizable commercial loans after 1995.  
Loan facilities are normally packaged into loan deals where multiple facilities are 
initiated at the same time, and each observation in the DealScan database is a loan 
facility. Following the identification methodology in Acharya, Almeida and 
Campello (2012), I consider only short term and long term credit lines, which are 
defined as those that have the LPC field “specific loan type” equal to “364-day 
Facility”, “Revolver/Line < 1 Yr”, “Revolver/Line >= 1 Yr”, or “Revolver/Line”. 
There are altogether 11,822 loan facilities in my sample, including 7,075 lines of 
credit loans and 4,747 spot market loans. 
The principal variable denoting cost of loan is the loan spread from DealScan 
database, which is measured in basis points above 6-month LIBOR. For loans not 
based on LIBOR, Dealscan converts the coupon spread into a LIBOR spread by 
adding or subtracting a constant differential reflecting the historical averages of 
the relevant spreads. And the resulting all-in-drawn spread is the main measure 
used in this study. 
While the LPC database provides comprehensive information on loan 
contract terms (LIBOR spread, maturity, collateral, etc.), it does not provide much 
information on borrowers, such as borrowers’ financial information, etc. I 
manually match the borrowers in the LPC database with the merged CRSP and 
COMPUSTAT. I then use COMPUSTAT database to extract data on accounting 
variables for a given company. Book equity is stockholder’s equity plus balance 
sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credits minus the book value of preferred 
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stock and post retirement assets. The book-to-market ratio is calculated by 
dividing book equity by COMPUSTAT market equity, which is COMPUSTAT 
stock price times number of shares outstanding at fiscal year-end. Profit is 
measured as operating profit (EBITDA) over total assets. Leverage is defined as 
the ratio of book liabilities (total assets minus book equity) to total market value 
of firm (COMPUSTAT market equity plus total assets minus book equity). Sales 
growth rate is measured as the increase in sales revenue over last year’s sales. 
To ensure that I only use accounting information that is publicly available at 
the time of the loan, I employ the following procedure. For those loans made in 
calendar year t, if the loan activation date is 6 months or later than the fiscal year 
ending month in calendar year t, I use the data of that fiscal year. If the loan 
activation date is less than 6 months after the fiscal year ending month, I use the 
data from the fiscal year ending in calendar year t-1. 
As in Hou and Robinson (2006) and Ali, Klasa and Yeung (2009), I define 
industry membership using three-digit SIC classification throughout the paper, 
which has the benefit of balancing two concerns. On the one hand, finer 
categories of industry classifications are potentially better as firms in unrelated 
lines of business are not grouped together. On the other hand, using too detailed 
an industry classification results in industry groups that are statistically unreliable, 
with firms being grouped into distinct industries arbitrarily. Choosing three-digit 
classifications strikes a balance between these two concerns. I also conduct 
robustness check and replicate the findings at the two-digit and four-digit SIC 
code, and the results are qualitatively similar. 
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I measure industry concentration using the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) 
as the sum of squared industry market shares using sales data for all firms in the 
same three-digit SIC code based on the Compustat database. Specifically industry 
concentration for industry i  in year t  is defined as HHI,  
∑ 
	,,	 , where 
	,,  is the market share of 
firm  in industry  in year . I perform the above calculations each year for each 
industry. The Herfindahl measure uses the entire distribution of industry market 
share information to obtain a complete picture of industry concentration. Small 
values of the Herfindahl index imply that the market is shared by many competing 
firms, while large values imply that market share is concentrated in the hands of a 
few large firms. HHI is a commonly used measure for product market competition 
and well-grounded in industrial organization theory (Tirole 1988). A higher level 
of HHI is associated with lower level of competition. Besides Compustat-based 
HHI, another industry concentration measure commonly used is the four firm 
concentration ratio (CR4-index) defined as the combined market share of the four 
largest firms in an industry.  
In addition to the abovementioned two concentration proxies computed solely 
based on Compustat database, I also employ the fitted HHI (FitHHI) at the three-
digit SIC code industry level suggested by Hoberg and Phillips (2010). This 
FitHHI combines Compustat data with Herfindahl data from the Commerce 
Department and employee data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, covering 
private and public firms from all industries. Based on product descriptions from 
annual firm 10-K filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), 
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this dynamic industry classification offers an alternative to more traditional fixed 
industry classifications such as SIC codes and the North American Industry 
Classification System (NAICS).  
In summary, I use the Compustat-based HHI, CR4, and FitHHI as my main 
industry competition proxies. In the robustness check section, I use Tariff rate 
reduction as a natural experiment of increased industry competition. The general 
idea is that lower tariff rate makes it less costly for foreign rivals to compete on 
domestic markets, and triggers a significant increase in competition from foreign 
rivals. The tariff data is retrieved from Robert Feenstra’s and Peter Schott’s Web 
page. Tariff rates are computed at the three-digit SIC code industry level as duties 
collected at U.S. Customs divided by the Free-On-Board custom value of imports. 
Following the methodology detailed in Frésard (2010) and Valta (2012), I identify 
an industry that experiences a tariff rate reduction if the reduction is at least three 
times larger than the median tariff rate reduction in that industry.  
Table 1 Panel A displays the time distribution of the loan sample. I group the 
loans into two main types, lines of credit loans and spot market term loans. The 
loan sample starts from year 1986 and ends at year 2008. There are fewer loans 
originated in the earlier years of the sample, and the coverage improves in more 
recent years. Over all the years, in general more than half of the loans are lines of 
credit, and the number of lines of credit increases gradually to the maximum 669 
in year 2005 and decreases to 502 in year 2007. The number of loans for year 
2008 is disproportionately fewer, and part of the reason is banks curtail lending 
due to financial crisis in 2007. 
23 
 
Table 1 Panel B shows the distribution of lines of credit loans and non-lines 
of credit loans by industry as categorized by one-digit SIC code. All financial 
firms are excluded from my sample. I can see that manufacturing firms borrow 
the most. In general, more lines of credit than other types of loans are taken for 
each of the industries. It is interesting to notice that firms in the mining industry 
take over twice as much of lines of credit than other types of loans. The 
distribution of lines of credit loans and other types of loans by loan purpose is 
reported in Table 1 Panel C. For all loans including both lines of credit loans and 
non-lines of credit loans, the most frequent reported loan purpose is “Corporate 
purpose”, “Debt repayment” is the second most frequent, and “Takeover” ranks 
third. For lines of credit, “Corporate purpose” still is the most frequent loan 
purpose; however, “Working capital” and “Debt repayment” rank second and 
third respectively. This makes sense and sheds special light on understanding 
firms’ intended purpose of their external financing via lines of credit. The result 
provides a nice complement to the empirical evidence in Sufi (2009) and  
Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) that credit lines played a crucial role in the 
liquidity management of firms during the recent credit crisis. 
 
5. Empirical Results 
5.1 Summary Statistics and Univariate Tests 
All the statistics are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles to mitigate the 
impact of outliers. Table 2 Panel A reports the descriptive statistics for key loan 
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characteristics for the entire universe of loans in the DealScan database. The cost 
of the loan is measured using AISD (All-In-Spread-Drawn) from the DealScan 
database, calculated as the interest rate the borrower pays in basis points over the 
London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) or LIBOR equivalent. This measure 
adds to the borrowing spread any annual fees paid to the lender. The mean 
(median) loan spread is about 210.4 (200.0) basis points, and mean (median) loan 
amount is about USD 279.8 (100.0) million. The mean (median) maturity of the 
loans is about 47.7 (54.0) months. 59.8% of the loans are lines of credit and over 
half of the loan facilities are required to pledge collaterals.  
Table 2 Panel B reports the descriptive statistics for borrowing firms’ 
characteristics, and Panel C presents the key statistics for industry characteristics, 
for all the three-digit SIC code industries in the sample. The average number of 
lines of credit in each industry is about 9.5, and the average amount of lines of 
credit in each industry is about USD 5.5 billion. The key variable of interest in 
this study is industry HHI, which is our main proxy for industry competition with 
higher HHI associated with lower competition. As can be seen from Table 2 Panel 
C, the average industry HHI is about 0.33. I also report other industry level 
performance measures using both equally-weighted and value-weighted methods. 
According to the equally weighted statistics, industry average market to book 
ratio is 2.09, while average ROA is 0.03. Average leverage is about 0.66, and 
average industry sales growth is about 20.4%. 
The univariate test result is presented in Table 3. I employ the following 
sample dividing mechanisms before conducting the test. I first rank all the 
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industries by HHI. Then I divide the entire sample into two subsamples, one with 
HHI above the mean (median) HHI and the other one with below mean (median) 
HHI. I report the univariate test statistics on industry characteristics by high and 
low industry HHI using both mean partition and median partition. Mean partition 
results are in Panel A1, B1 and C1; median partition results are in Panel A2, B2 
and C2. As shown in the t-test result in Table 3 Panel A1 and Panel A2, more 
competitive industries utilize significantly more lines of credit, both in terms of 
number of loans and amount of loans. For the more competitive industries, there 
are on average around 12.1 lines of credit taken by the firms in the industry each 
year, which amount to USD 7.1 billion. And for the sample with below average 
industry competitiveness, there are on average around 4.9 lines of credit taken by 
the firms in the industry each year, which amount to USD 2.7 billion. In addition, 
it is also observed that the equal-weighted and value-weighted industry annual 
sales growth rate is significantly higher for more competitive industries. On per 
firm basis, fewer lines of credit are taken in more competitive industries, in terms 
of both number of lines of credit per firm, and amount of lines of credit per firm. 
The univariate test result on loan characteristics for these two samples is 
reported in Table 3 Panel C1 (mean partition) and Panel C2 (median partition). 
Loan size is larger for borrowers in more competitive industries. The difference 
between the two groups of borrowers is both statistically and economically 
significant. Loan spread is lower and collateral requirement is also lower in more 
competitive market with below average HHI. From the three main loan contract 
terms, we can see that firms in more competitive industries are offered more 
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favorable loan contract terms. The loans taken by firms in more competitive 
industry are more likely to be lines of credit loans instead of term loans, as 
indicated by the LC_dummy, which is a dummy variable indicating whether the 
loan is a line of credit. Firms in more competitive industries choose to take lines 
of credit loans about 61% of the time, whereas for firms in less competitive 
industries, they take lines of credit only 58% of the time.  
 
5.2 Multivariate Regression Results 
5.2.1 Effect of Lines of Credit on Firm Profit  
In this section, I attempt to ascertain whether lines of credit enhance firm 
value and lead to more advantageous positions in the industry. Specifically, I test 
the first hypothesis that acquisition of lines of credit increases firms’ future profit. 
Moreover, I also study whether the value enhancing role of a line of credit is more 
pronounced in more competitive market. 
Multivariate regression analysis is conducted to study the effect of getting a 
line of credit on firms’ profit, and the interaction effect with industry 
competitiveness. Table 4 Panel A presents the OLS estimates of the effect of 
getting a line of credit this year on firms’ profit next year, controlling for other 
firm and industry characteristics. The dependent variable is profit, defined as the 
borrowing firms’ net income over total assets. The key explanatory variables of 
interests include Dummy_getlc, which is an indicator variable equal to one if the 
firm has taken at least a line of credit in this year, Log(Sum_LC), which is the 
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logarithm of total amount of lines of credit acquired by the firm in a specific year, 
and Log(Num_LC), which is the logarithm of total number of lines of credit 
acquired by the firm in a specific year. The result indicates that obtaining a line of 
credit in the current year is associated with greater firm profit next year. In 
particular, obtaining a credit line leads to about 1.4% increases in profit in the 
subsequent year, as evidenced in the coefficient of dummy_getlc in model 1, and 
the coefficieints of log(Sum_LC) and log(Num_LC) in model 2 and model 3. This 
evidence is consistent with the notion that a line of credit is a flexible financing 
tool and a signaling mechanism for firms to compete aggressively in the product 
market.  
In the next three panels of Table 4, I report the interaction effect of industry 
competition on firms’ profit next year. In Panel B model 3, the coefficients on 
interaction term of HHI and dummy_getlc are negative and significant at 1% level, 
controlling for other firm and industry level characteristic variables, indicating 
that in more competitive market, obtaining a line of credit has a more pronounced 
effect on the firm’s profit. The interaction effects convey similar message for the 
other two industry concentration proxies in model 5 and model 7. In Panel C and 
Panel D, the interaction effect of number and amount of lines of credit with 
industry competition are reported, and consistent results are observed. In 
summary, the analysis demonstrates that lines of credit play a more important role 
in enhancing firm value in more competitive industries, which supports the first 
hypothesis that the profit enhancing effect of lines of credit is more pronounced in 
more competitive market. 
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In the following two subsections, I study firms’ financing behavior with 
respect to the acquisition of lines of credit, and then look into the details in the 
contract terms of these lines of credit, to examine the effect of industry 
competition on firms’ strategic usage of lines of credit. 
 
5.2.2 Industry Usage of Lines of Credit 
Table 5 reports the effect of competition on industry total number and 
amount of lines of credit utilized, controlling for other industry level 
characteristics, year fixed effect and industry fixed effect, with standard errors 
clustered at industry level. To circumvent the concern that some large industries 
with a large number of firms tend to have lower level of HHI and utilize more 
external financing at the same time, I scale the industry total number and amount 
of lines of credit used by total number of firms in the industry, to mitigate the 
effect of a mechanical association between industry HHI and usage of lines of 
credit. So the dependent variable in Panel A (Panel B) is industry total number 
(dollar amount) of lines of credit acquired scaled by number of firms in the 
industry.  
The central finding is that more competitive industry is associated with lower 
usage of lines of credit, reflected both in industry total number and total amount 
of usage per firm, controlling for other industry level characteristics. As shown in 
Panel A model 1 and 2, the coefficients on the industry HHI and the four firm 
concentration ratio CR4 are both positive and significant at 1% level. As industry 
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concentration is the opposite of competition, the interpretation is that more 
competitive industries acquire fewer lines of credit, in terms of both number and 
dollar amount. The coefficient on FitHHI, however, is not significant, although 
still positive. Panel B reports the effect of industry competition on the industry 
total dollar amount of lines of credit acquired per firm. Regression results lack 
significance for all the three models in this panel, suggesting the supply side 
effect dominates the demand side effect in determining the usage intensity of lines 
of credit. 
 
5.2.3 Loan Contract Terms  
Next I examine the effect of industry competitiveness on the loan spread in a 
line of credit loan. Table 6 Panel A provides the OLS estimates of the effect of 
industry HHI on loan spread, with robust standard error clustering at firm level, 
controlling for other industry level characteristics. I find that HHI is negatively 
related with loan spread in a line of credit loan. In model 2, the coefficient of HHI 
is -41.32 and is significant at the 1% confidence level, which means 1% decrease 
in industry HHI will lead to about 0.41 basis point increase in loan spread charged, 
lending support for the hypothesis that the loan spread on bank lines of credit is 
higher in more competitive market.  
This positive (negative) association between industry competition 
(concentration) and loan spread result is robust using other alternative proxies of 
industry competition, including FitHHI and CR4. In column 4, the coefficient on 
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CR4 is -29.21. That is, a 10% increase in the four-firm market share will lead to 
about 3.4 basis point increase in loan spread, controlling for other firm and 
industry characteristics. The effect is both statistically and economically 
significant. This finding is also consistent with the result reported in Valta (2012). 
He finds that on average, loans to firms in competitive industries (HHI in the 
lowest quartile) have an 8.4% higher loan spread than comparable loans in less 
competitive industries. 
Other control variables are in general having the expected signs. Total assets 
of the borrowing firm are negatively associated with loan spread, indicating larger 
firms have lower interest rate, consistent with the notion that total assets are a 
proxy for the credit risk of the firm and larger firms are associated with lower 
credit risk. Market to book ratio is negatively related to the loan spread. To the 
extent that market to book can be interpreted as a proxy for growth opportunity 
(Fama and French, 1993), a negative sign on market to book ratio implies that 
firms with higher growth options are charged with lower interest rate. Leverage is 
having a positive effect on loan spread, reflecting that highly levered firms face 
higher default risk and are charged with higher interest rate. Collateral has a 
positive impact of loan spreads, consistent with the notion that riskier borrowers 
are more likely to have collateral requirements as well as pay higher interest on 
loans. The positive impact of collateral on loan rates has been documented in 
many other empirical studies (Berger and Udell 1990, Bharath et al 2011). From 
the regression result, we can also observe that larger loans are charged with lower 
spreads reflecting economies of scale at loan origination. I also include several 
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industry level characteristic variables. In particular, industry average market to 
book ratio and leverage ratio are positively correlated with loan spread. 
Besides the price term of the loan contract, I also study the other two non-
price dimension of the contract, including loan amount granted and loan collateral 
imposed. I examine the effect of competition on the loan amount granted for lines 
of credit loans in Panel B. I find that the loan amount of an average line of credit 
granted is lower in more competitive industry. The coefficients on all three 
proxies of industry concentration are positive and statistically significant at 1% 
level. This indicates that banks offer smaller loans to firms in more competitive 
industry. The coefficients of the control variables have the expected signs in the 
loan amount regression. Collateral has negative coefficients in all specifications in 
Panel B, implying that collateralized lines of credit loans are smaller in size. Loan 
maturity has positive coefficients, suggesting that longer loans are larger in size. 
Borrowers’ assets size is positively related to loan amount, consistent with the 
notion that larger firms take larger loans. 
The last contract term I look at is loan collateral imposed on lines of credit 
loans, and the result is reported in Panel C. I find that lines of credit loans taken 
by firms in more competitive industries are more likely to be collateralized, 
controlling for other firm, loan, and industry characteristics.  
Overall, the results on all the three aspects of loan contract, including loan 
spread, loan amount and collateral requirement point to the direction that less 
favorable loan contract terms are offered to firms in more competitive industries. 
Although I have controlled for firm level risk using leverage and Altman’s Z-
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score, and industry level risk using industry leverage, the significance of these 
results remain, which suggests that the competitive environment of the borrowing 
firms, i.e., the specific industry they are in, plays an important role when lenders 
design the loan contracts. 
 
6. Robustness Check 
6.1 Firm Profit Regression: Instrumental Variable Approach 
To address the potential endogenous concern that firms with better growth 
opportunities or investment prospect acquire more lines of credit and they are also 
having better profit next year, I reexamine the regression analysis using 
instrument variable approach.  
The instrument variable I choose is “lending relationship”, which is defined 
as the proportion of total amount of relationship loans out of the total amount of 
all types of loans taken by the borrower in the past 3 years. It is documented in the 
literature that higher lending relationship correlates positively with the amount 
and the number of lines of credit acquired (Berger and Udell, 1995). 
From the first stage result of the IV regression in Table 7, we can see that 
lending relationship indeed has positive and significant association with the 
dummy for acquisition of lines of credit, as well as the amount and number of 
lines of credit acquired. In the second stage regression, we can see that the 
relationship between L/C usage intensity and profit in the next year is still 
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positive, which shows that our result is robust. The conclusion is hence that 
acquiring lines of credit leads to better firm performance next year. 
 
6.2 Natural Experiment Using Tariff Rate Reduction  
I conduct further robustness check of my main results using natural 
experiment, to address the potential concern that industry structure might be 
endogenous and financing choices may affect industry structure. In specific, 
sudden import tariff rate reduction in the product market is employed as a quasi-
natural experiment to simulate for exogenous increase in industry competition. 
The idea of using import tariff rate reductions to proxy for unexpected sudden 
increase in the level of industry competition is based on the observation that 
increase in tariff rates makes it easier for foreign rivals to penetrate and compete 
in the domestic markets. As a result, the presence of foreign rivals in the domestic 
market would be substantially expanded, leading to greater intensity of product 
market competition.  
To investigate the notion that a relaxation of tariff rates spurs an increase in 
import penetration, I define import penetration as the total value of imports 
divided by foreign imports plus domestic production, following the method in 
Bertrand (2004), Irvine and Pontiff (2009) and Valta (2012). The “import 
penetration” variable measures the percent of production by foreign versus 
domestic firms, or alternatively, the aggregate market share of foreign competitors 
in the local market. In the similar vein to Valta (2012), I identify an industry that 
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experiences a large tariff rate reduction if the largest tariff rate reduction is larger 
than three times the mean tariff rate reduction in that industry. 
Post_tariff_reduction is equal to one if the observation post-dates a large tariff 
reduction in that industry.  
Table 8 presents the robustness check analysis on the profit enhancing effect 
of lines of credit in varying degrees of industry competition, in order to ascertain 
the result shown in Table 4. The dependent variable in Table 8 is the profit of the 
borrowing firms in the year after the line of credit. The explanatory variables of 
most interests are the interaction terms of lines of credit usage with post tariff 
reduction dummy, with the variable post_tariff_reduction denotes sudden 
increases in industry competition. Panel A reports the result on the interaction 
effect of post_tariff_reduction and dummy_getlc, where dummy_getlc is the 
dummy variable denoting the acquisition of at least one line of credit in a specific 
year. Under all three specifications, the coefficients on dummy_getlc are all 
positive and significant, confirming the baseline effect that acquisition of lines of 
credit brings benefit to borrowing firms in terms of higher profit in the next year. 
Furthermore, the coefficient on the interaction term is positive and significant, 
suggesting that a more pronounced profit-enhancing role of lines of credit in more 
competitive environment, subsequent to the reduction of import tariff. 
Similarly, Panel B and Panel C tabulate the result of the interaction effect of 
the number and amount of lines of credit acquired with the exogenous shock in 
industry competition as captured in sudden tariff reduction event. My analysis 
again reveals that in more competitive market, acquiring more lines of credit both 
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in terms of number and amount leads to higher profit for the borrowing firms in 
the next year. Taken together, the robustness result in Table 8 lends support to the 
hypothesis 1 that the value-enhancing role of lines of credit is accentuated in more 
competitive markets. 
Next, I examine the effect of sudden tariff reduction on the usage of lines of 
credit, to provide robustness check to the result in Table 5. Table 9 reports the 
regression result, with number and dollar amount of lines of credit as dependent 
variable, and the dummy post_tariff_reduction as key explanatory variable. We 
can see from the result that irrespective of the proxy for the usage intensity of 
lines of credit, post_tariff_reduction is not significant in either of the two models, 
suggesting that there is no significantly distinguishable difference in terms of 
lines of credit usage under different levels of market competition.  As discussed 
earlier, the strategic usage of lines of credit in a competitive industry is an 
equilibrium outcome of the credit supply from banks and demand from industrial 
firms. This insignificant result on lines of credit usage observed in Table 9 
suggests that banks intentionally limit the supply of lines of credit to the more 
competitive industries, in order to control the amount of credit exposure to those 
industries. 
Table 10 presents univariate test results on loan characteristics before and 
after a large reduction of import tariff rates. As tabulated in the test result in both 
Panel A and Panel B, there is significant increase in loan spread after tariff rate 
reduction, consistent with the earlier loan spread regression result in Table 6 
Panel A. However, the results on loan collateral and amount seem quite weak. 
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In addition to the univariate result, I also report the multivariate regression 
results on the effect of a large reduction of import tariff rates on the loan contract 
terms of lines of credit loans in Table 11. Estimates on loan spread charged on 
lines of credit are presented in Panel A. Probit analysis results on loan collateral 
requirement on lines of credit are presented in Panel B, and Panel C provides the 
result on the loan amount granted. As shown in the result in model 1 and 2, a 
large tariff rate reduction as proxied by Post_tariff_reduction dummy, leads to 
24.7 basis points increase in loan spread charged (model 1), and this effect is 
about 18.8 after controlling for industry level characterizes (model 2). This 
suggests that 18.8 basis points higher loan spreads in the aftermath of a 
competitive shock, all else equal. This result further validates the hypothesis that a 
higher intensity of competition significantly increases loan spreads. 
Besides loan spread, I also examine the effect of Post_tariff_reduction 
dummy on loan amount in Panel B and collateral requirement in Panel C. For loan 
amount regressions, the effect of Post_tariff_reduction dummy is not significant, 
suggesting there might not be any association between competition and loan 
amount granted. Panel C shows the result on collateral requirements, where post 
reduction dummies are positive and significant in model 1 but not in model 2. 
This result provides weak support for our earlier finding that lenders are more 
likely to ask for collateral for loans taken by firms in more competitive 
environment. Overall, the results support the earlier finding that lines of credit 
contracts carry less favorable terms with respect to higher interest rate charged 




Bank lines of credit provide financial convenience and flexibility to the 
borrowing firms. In this paper, I study the role of lines of credit in the unique 
setting of a competitive product market. Firms do not operate in isolation; the 
structure of the product market exerts great influence on firms’ production 
choices and investment decisions, which are also related to firms’ financing 
strategies. This paper primarily focuses on drawing empirical evidence on how 
product market competition affects the value-enhancing role of lines of credit, as 
well as the usage and contract terms of lines of credit loans. Three main 
hypotheses are formulated and empirical analysis is conducted to test each of 
them.  
The empirical evidence provides mixed support for my hypotheses. First and 
foremost, I show that lines of credit have a more pronounced effect on enhancing 
profits in more competitive market, consistent with the notion that lines of credit 
deliver more benefit to firms in terms of funding guarantee and financial 
flexibility in adverse industry environment. 
Second, I find that firms acquire fewer lines of credit in more competitive 
industries, suggesting credit rationing or supply restrictions exercised by lenders 
when offering loans to firms in these industries. Considering these firms face 
greater need for financing and intense competition in more competitive markets, 
this result leads to the implication that banks may be more cautious in granting 
loans to borrowers from highly competitive industries.  
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Investigating further along this direction, I examine the contract terms 
imposed on bank lines of credit to borrowers from highly competitive industries. 
My analysis reveals find that the loan spread charged on lines of credit is higher 
for borrowers in more competitive markets, suggesting less favorable contracts 
are offered to those firms. In addition, the collateral requirement is more stringent 
and loan amount is smaller for those loans.  
Altogether, this paper examines a fundamental question about the role of 
bank lines of credit for firms in a rich context of a competitive product market, 
which has unique contribution to the literature as most of existing papers only 
examine firms’ investment or financing behavior at the individual company level. 
Overall, the result highlights the importance of lines of credit in providing lower 
cost financing and flexibility to firms that have access to them, and how product 
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Appendix: Definition of Key Variables 
AISD is the “All In Spread-Drawn”, which is the all-inclusive cost of a drawn 
loan to the borrower. This equals the coupon spread over LIBOR on the drawn 
amount plus the annual fee and is reported in basis points.  
Asset Turnover is defined as sales over total assets. 
Collateral is a dummy variable indicating whether the borrower needs to pledge 
collateral to the lender in the loan contract.  
Coverage is defined as log of ratio (1+ EBITDA) divided by Interest Expenses.  
CR4 is the sum of the market shares of the four largest firms in an industry. 
Current Ratio is the current assets divided by the current liabilities. 
Dummy_getlc is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm has taken at least a 
line of credit in this year. 
Facility Amount is the dollar amount of loan facility in millions.  
FitHHI is Herfindahl-Hirschman Index at the three-digit SIC code industry level 
based on Hoberg and Phillips (2010). It combines Compustat data with Herfindahl 
data from the Commerce Department and employee data from the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, covers private and public firms, and all industries. 
HHI is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index at the three-digit SIC code industry level 
based on Compustat database. It is calculated as the sum of squared sales-based 
market shares of all firms in that industry in a given year.  
Import penetration: Total value of imports divided by total value of imports plus 
domestic production at the three-digit SIC code industry level. 
LC_dummy is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the loan facility is a line of credit, 
and 0 otherwise.  
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Lending relationship is defined as the proportion of total amount of relationship 
loans out of the total amount of all types of loans taken by the borrower in past 3 
years. 
Leverage is defined as the ratio of book value of total debt to book value of assets.  
Leverage_Ind is defined as industry average leverage in a specific year, with 
Leverage for each firm defined as the ratio of book value of total debt to book 
value of assets. 
Log(assets) is the logarithm of total book assets as obtained from Compustat 
fundamental annual data file. 
Log(loan amount) is the logarithm of the total amount of the loan facility. 
Log(maturity) is the logarithm of maturity of the loan facility in months. 
Log(num_lc) is the logarithm of total number of lines of credit acquired by the 
firm in the specific year. 
Log(Sum_lc) is the logarithm of total dollar amount of lines of credit acquired by 
the firm in the specific year. 
Maturity is length in months between facility activation date and maturity date.  
MB is the ratio of (Book value of assets - Book value of equity + market value of 
equity) divided by book value of assets.  
MB_Ind is industry average market to book value.  
Ncov is the number of covenant constraints in loan contracts. 
Nfincov is the number of financial covenant constraints in loan contracts. 
Nfirm_Ind is the total number of firms in a three-digit SIC code industry in a 
specific year. 
Ngencov is the number of general covenant constraints in loan contracts. 
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Num(LC)_firm is the number of lines of credit taken by the individual firm in a 
specific year.  
Num(LC)_Ind is the number of lines of credit taken by all the firms in that 
industry in a specific year.  
Num(LC) per firm is defined as the number of lines of credit taken by all the firms 
in that industry in a specific year divided by the total number of firms in that 
industry. 
Profit next year is defined as operating profit (EBITDA) over total assets in the 
subsequent year of the loan.  
Post_tariff_reduction: a dummy variable indicating an industry experiences large 
tariff rate reduction. It is equal to 1 if the largest tariff rate reduction is larger than 
three times the mean tariff rate reduction in that industry. 
ROA is defined as net income over total assets.  
ROA_Ind is defined as industry average ROA in a specific year, with ROA for 
each firm defined as net income over total assets.  
Sale_gr_Ind is defined as industry average sales growth rate in a specific year. 
Sales growth rate is defined as the increase in sales divided by last year’s sales for 
each firm. 
Sum(LC)_firm is the amount in billions of dollars of lines of credit loans taken by 
the individual firms in that industry in a specific year. 
Sum(LC)_Ind is the amount in billions of dollars of lines of credit loans taken by 
all the firms in that industry in a specific year. 
Sum(LC) per firm is defined as the total amount in billions of dollar of lines of 
credit taken by all the firms in that industry in a specific year divided by the total 
number of firms in that industry. 
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Tangibility is the ratio of Property, Plant, and Equipment (PPE) to total assets.  
TL_dummy is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the loan facility is a term loan, 
and 0 otherwise.  
Z-score is estimated as the follows: 1.2×(current assets – current liabilites)/total 
assets + 1.4×(retained earnings/total assets) + 3.3×(pretax income/total assets) + 
0.6×(market capitalization/ total liabilities) + 0.9×(sales/total assets). 
Total Assets is the book value of assets of the borrower in millions as reported in 








Table 1 Distribution of Loans by Year, Industry and Loan Purpose 
This table shows the distribution of the sample of corporate loans from DealScan and the 
breakdown of lines of credit versus non-line of credit loans by year (Panel A), industry 
(Panel B) and loan purpose (Panel C). Year is the year which the loan is originated as 
recorded in DealScan database. Industry is defined using one-digit SIC codes from 
Compustat Fundamental Annual File. Primary Purpose of the loan is from DealScan 
database. 
 
Table 1 Panel A: Distribution of Loan by Year and Type 
Year Non-L/C L/C All Loans All Firms Borrower% 
1987 21 22 43 6,345 0.7% 
1988 83 31 114 7,693 1.5% 
1989 76 60 136 7,520 1.8% 
1990 72 70 142 7,506 1.9% 
1991 91 98 189 7,670 2.5% 
1992 124 135 259 8,050 3.2% 
1993 126 162 288 8,674 3.3% 
1994 94 228 322 9,162 3.5% 
1995 99 247 346 10,107 3.4% 
1996 137 301 438 10,423 4.2% 
1997 245 432 677 10,197 6.6% 
1998 230 386 616 10,388 5.9% 
1999 325 377 702 10,484 6.7% 
2000 308 447 755 9,966 7.6% 
2001 258 478 736 9,277 7.9% 
2002 290 551 841 8,829 9.5% 
2003 425 596 1,021 8,475 12.0% 
2004 498 667 1,165 8,718 13.4% 
2005 453 669 1,122 8,321 13.5% 
2006 393 594 987 7,792 12.7% 
2007 382 502 884 6,892 12.8% 
2008 17 22 39 479 8.1% 




Table 1 Panel B: Industry Classification of Loan Borrowers 
1-Digit SIC Non-L/C L/C All Loans 
1 271 633 904 
2 745 1,102 1,847 
3 1,291 1,648 2,939 
4 868 1,418 2,286 
5 657 1,093 1,750 
7 590 742 1,332 
8 285 396 681 
9 7 15 22 






Table 1 Panel C: Loan Purpose  
Primary Purpose Non-L/C L/C All Loans 
Acquis. Line 339 276 615 
Aircraft finance 1 0 1 
CP backup 14 716 730 
Capital expend. 37 39 76 
Corp. purposes 1,368 2,444 3,812 
Cred Enhanc 4 1 5 
Debt Repay. 844 1,078 1,922 
Debtor-in-poss. 37 60 97 
Dividend Recap 41 18 59 
ESOP 6 1 7 
Equip. Purch. 59 9 68 
Exit financing 31 14 45 
IPO Relat. Finan. 14 15 29 
LBO 289 119 408 
Lease finance 4 0 4 
MBO 2 1 3 
Mort. Warehse. 1 2 3 
Other 43 45 88 
Proj. finance 32 13 45 
Purch. Hardware 2 0 2 
Real estate 28 11 39 
Rec. Prog. 2 2 4 
Recap. 90 79 169 
Securities Purchase 4 2 6 
Ship finance 0 1 1 
Spinoff 56 42 98 
Stock buyback 70 52 122 
Takeover 692 490 1,182 
TelcomBuildout 22 8 30 
Trade finance 5 4 9 
Work. cap. 610 1,533 2,143 




Table 2 Descriptive Statistics for Key Variables 
The table provides descriptive statistics of various loan-specific, firm-specific and industry related characteristics. Panel A reports key 
characteristics of the Loan Facilities. Panel B presents firm characteristics and Panel C reports key characteristics of the industries. See Appendix 
for detailed definitions of all variables used in this table. 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for Key Loan Characteristics 
 N mean std min p25 p50 p75 max 
Facility Amount 11821 279.847 568.185 0.046 30.000 100.000 300.000 12000.000 
AISD 10594 210.327 137.323 18.000 100.000 200.000 280.000 700.000 
Collateral 11822 0.534 0.499 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Ncov 11822 11.367 1.262 10.000 11.000 11.000 11.000 20.000 
Ngencov 11822 10.922 0.269 10.000 11.000 11.000 11.000 11.000 
Nfincov 11822 0.445 1.232 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 9.000 
Maturity 11085 47.715 25.773 1.000 26.000 54.000 60.000 366.000 
LC_dummy 11822 0.598 0.490 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
TL_dummy 11822 0.309 0.462 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
 
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics for Key Firm Characteristics  
 N mean std min p25 p50 p75 max 
Total Assets 157492 1.550 5.882 0.000 0.015 0.086 0.520 60.749 
Coverage  15533 18.878 102.323 -321.048 2.410 5.385 12.431 739.333 
Leverage  156641 0.677 0.887 0.019 0.315 0.534 0.728 7.175 
Tangibility 157006 0.309 0.257 0.000 0.096 0.232 0.475 0.932 
MB  133128 2.906 5.428 0.498 1.089 1.484 2.476 43.927 
Current ratio 152689 2.792 3.783 0.015 1.052 1.729 2.946 27.917 
ROA 155432 -0.080 0.686 -4.972 -0.035 0.094 0.159 0.456 
Asset turnover 156079 1.117 0.921 0.000 0.457 0.941 1.515 4.887 
Sales growth rate 132987 0.315 1.157 -0.999 -0.034 0.091 0.285 8.897 




Panel C: Descriptive Statistics for Key Industry Characteristics 
 N mean std min p25 p50 p75 max 
Num(LC)_Ind 5336 9.520 22.182 0.000 0.000 0.000 7.000 134.000 
Sum(LC)_Ind 5336 5.530 18.828 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.200 134.068 
Nfirm_Ind 5336 29.515 65.243 1.000 6.000 13.000 28.000 1216.000 
Num(LC) per firm 5336 0.565 1.502 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.375 10.000 
Sum(LC) per firm 5336 0.267 0.946 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.063 6.788 
HHI 5328 0.325 0.253 0.034 0.144 0.244 0.427 1.000 
FitHHI 3541 0.732 0.323 0.316 0.516 0.647 0.820 2.545 
CR4 5263 0.315 0.261 0.019 0.122 0.231 0.429 1.000 
Total assets (bil) 5336 30.087 49.387 0.176 2.025 8.171 30.397 190.003 
Average assets 5336 1.288 1.708 0.043 0.212 0.562 1.546 6.521 
 
        
Equal-Weighted         
MB_Ind 5311 2.090 1.134 1.023 1.308 1.681 2.420 5.303 
ROA_Ind 5332 0.026 0.151 -0.393 -0.013 0.079 0.123 0.186 
Leverage_Ind 5336 0.662 0.184 0.399 0.539 0.626 0.743 1.139 
Sale_gr_Ind 5073 0.204 0.232 -0.088 0.046 0.135 0.301 0.800 
         
Valued-Weighted         
MB_Ind 5311 1.446 0.559 0.616 1.061 1.334 1.732 2.832 
ROA_Ind 5332 0.127 0.046 0.041 0.096 0.125 0.158 0.220 
Leverage_Ind 5336 0.611 0.133 0.356 0.525 0.614 0.701 0.864 





Table 3 Univariate Test Statistics 
This table provides descriptive statistics and univariate test result of key industry characteristics and loan characteristics. For the partition of the 
sample, we first rank the sample observations by industry HHI, then divide the entire sample into two parts by the mean (median) level of industry 
HHI. Panel A1 and A2 provide univariate test statistics for key industry characteristics of high versus low industry competition partitioned by 
mean and median industry HHI. Panel B1 and B2 provides similar details for firm specific characteristics. Panel C1 and C2 provides similar 
details for loan facility related characteristics. The last two columns of each panel provide difference in mean and t-test statistic for difference in 
means. See Appendix for detailed definitions of all variables used in this table. (***Significant at one percent level, **Significant at five percent 





Panel A1: Industry Characteristics Classified by High and Low Industry Competition (Mean Partition) 
 N Mean Std Median N Mean Std Median Diff in mean t-statistic 
 High competition (Low HHI) Low competition (High HHI) 
Num(LC) 3445 12.051 25.270 1.000 1891 4.908 13.869 0.000 7.143*** 11.39 
Sum(LC) 3445 7.077 21.410 0.043 1891 2.710 12.373 0.000 4.367*** 8.15 
Nfirm_Ind 3445 42.046 78.249 21.000 1891 6.685 7.111 5.000 35.36*** 19.61 
Num(LC) per firm 3445 0.399 0.907 0.037 1891 0.868 2.174 0.000 -0.469*** -11.03 
Sum(LC) per firm 3445 0.226 0.776 0.001 1891 0.343 1.192 0.000 -0.117*** -4.32 
HHI 3445 0.173 0.077 0.167 1883 0.603 0.226 0.531 -0.430*** -101.51 
FitHHI 2498 0.645 0.242 0.590 1043 0.942 0.390 0.808 -0.298*** -27.55 
CR4 3380 0.156 0.081 0.148 1883 0.601 0.227 0.530 -0.446*** -102.92 
Total assets (bil) 3445 41.535 56.663 15.426 1891 9.231 18.976 2.047 32.30*** 24.06 
Average assets 3445 1.377 1.747 0.617 1891 1.127 1.621 0.429 0.250*** 5.13 
           
Equal-Weighted           
MB_Ind 3445 2.108 1.092 1.715 1866 2.057 1.208 1.606 0.0516 1.58 
ROA_Ind 3445 0.026 0.143 0.074 1887 0.027 0.165 0.086 -0.000850 -0.20 
Leverage_Ind 3445 0.665 0.164 0.633 1891 0.656 0.215 0.609 0.00875* 1.66 
Sale_gr_Ind 3303 0.219 0.224 0.149 1770 0.175 0.243 0.108 0.0439*** 6.46 
           
Value-Weighted           
MB_Ind 3445 1.443 0.527 1.347 1866 1.452 0.613 1.314 -0.00831 -0.52 
ROA_Ind 3445 0.128 0.041 0.126 1887 0.125 0.054 0.123 0.00309** 2.33 
Leverage_Ind 3445 0.617 0.117 0.617 1891 0.600 0.157 0.603 0.0166*** 4.38 





Panel A2: Industry Characteristics Classified by High and Low Industry Competition (Median Partition) 
 N Mean Std Median N Mean Std Median Diff in mean t-statistic 
 High competition (Low HHI) Low competition (High HHI) 
Num(LC) 2664 14.010 27.540 2.000 2664 5.058 13.674 0.000 8.952*** 15.03 
Sum(LC) 2664 8.352 23.574 0.095 2664 2.723 11.770 0.000 5.629*** 11.03 
Nfirm_Ind 2664 50.456 87.032 26.000 2664 8.657 8.767 6.000 41.80*** 24.66 
Num(LC) per firm 2664 0.391 0.863 0.048 2664 0.742 1.926 0.000 -0.351*** -8.58 
Sum(LC) per firm 2664 0.236 0.808 0.003 2664 0.300 1.067 0.000 -0.0645** -2.49 
HHI 2664 0.142 0.056 0.144 2664 0.509 0.240 0.427 -0.367*** -76.70 
FitHHI 1951 0.617 0.232 0.558 1586 0.875 0.360 0.755 -0.258*** -25.74 
CR4 2599 0.121 0.058 0.121 2664 0.504 0.244 0.424 -0.383*** -77.85 
Total assets (bil) 2664 48.337 60.775 19.332 2664 11.920 22.956 3.059 36.42*** 28.93 
Average assets 2664 1.422 1.782 0.622 2664 1.155 1.618 0.485 0.266*** 5.71 
           
Equal-Weighted           
MB_Ind 2664 2.168 1.120 1.775 2644 2.010 1.142 1.590 0.158*** 5.08 
ROA_Ind 2664 0.019 0.145 0.070 2664 0.034 0.156 0.086 -0.0153*** -3.70 
Leverage_Ind 2664 0.668 0.160 0.638 2664 0.655 0.204 0.609 0.0128** 2.55 
Sale_gr_Ind 2552 0.234 0.226 0.167 2520 0.174 0.233 0.108 0.0601*** 9.33 
           
Value-Weighted           
MB_Ind 2664 1.450 0.524 1.352 2644 1.442 0.591 1.319 0.00718 0.47 
ROA_Ind 2664 0.127 0.040 0.125 2664 0.127 0.052 0.125 0.000158 0.12 
Leverage_Ind 2664 0.616 0.114 0.617 2664 0.607 0.148 0.611 0.00907** 2.50 





Panel B1: Firm Characteristics Classified by High and Low Industry Competition (Mean Partition) 
 N Mean Std Median N Mean Std Median Diff in mean t-statistic 
 High competition (Low HHI) Low competition (High HHI) 
Total Assets  101990 1.720 6.371 0.080 55502 1.238 4.841 0.097 0.482*** 15.54 
Coverage  10648 16.516 106.554 5.237 4885 24.029 92.234 5.922 -7.513*** -4.25 
Leverage  101532 0.661 0.884 0.516 55109 0.706 0.891 0.561 -0.0452*** -9.64 
Tangibility 101800 0.308 0.266 0.217 55206 0.310 0.240 0.254 -0.00185 -1.36 
MB  85966 3.136 5.601 1.583 47162 2.488 5.069 1.352 0.648*** 20.88 
Current ratio 99247 2.929 3.935 1.748 53442 2.538 3.468 1.702 0.391*** 19.30 
ROA 100840 -0.107 0.705 0.088 54592 -0.031 0.646 0.103 -0.0762*** -20.96 
Asset turnover 101280 1.045 0.905 0.849 54799 1.251 0.935 1.108 -0.206*** -42.38 
Sales growth rate 86966 0.357 1.233 0.099 46021 0.237 0.992 0.079 0.120*** 18.07 
Z-score 101990 2.514 18.147 2.378 55502 1.765 16.892 2.522 0.749*** 8.02 
 
 
Panel B2: Firm Characteristics Classified by High and Low Industry Competition (Median Partition) 
 N Mean Std Median N Mean Std Median Diff in mean t-statistic 
 High competition (Low HHI) Low competition (High HHI) 
Total Assets 78761 1.870 6.776 0.079 78716 1.231 4.804 0.093 0.638*** 21.56 
Coverage  8501 15.596 107.206 5.212 7032 22.846 95.947 5.771 -7.250*** -4.40 
Leverage  78431 0.657 0.895 0.507 78195 0.696 0.878 0.556 -0.0393*** -8.77 
Tangibility 78642 0.304 0.269 0.205 78349 0.314 0.245 0.253 -0.0101*** -7.82 
MB  66496 3.282 5.744 1.646 66624 2.530 5.061 1.373 0.752*** 25.33 
Current ratio 76806 2.984 4.002 1.744 75869 2.596 3.535 1.717 0.388*** 20.07 
ROA 77932 -0.128 0.728 0.083 77491 -0.032 0.637 0.102 -0.0965*** -27.81 
Asset turnover 78263 1.007 0.888 0.805 77807 1.228 0.940 1.079 -0.221*** -47.70 
Sales growth rate 67710 0.383 1.289 0.102 65276 0.245 0.996 0.082 0.138*** 21.77 






Panel C1: Loan Characteristics Classified by High and Low Industry Competition (Mean Partition) 
 N Mean Std Median N Mean Std Median Diff in mean t-statistic 
 High competition (Low HHI) Low competition (High HHI) 
Facility Amount 7373 304.072 607.316 110.000 4448 239.693 494.032 100.000 64.38*** 5.98 
AISD 6576 207.619 138.653 200.000 4018 214.760 135.017 200.000 -7.140*** -2.60 
Collateral 7373 0.517 0.500 1.000 4449 0.562 0.496 1.000 -0.0447*** -4.73 
Ncov 7373 11.358 1.245 11.000 4449 11.381 1.291 11.000 -0.0233 -0.97 
Ngencov 7373 10.923 0.267 11.000 4449 10.920 0.272 11.000 0.00320 0.63 
Nfincov 7373 0.435 1.215 0.000 4449 0.461 1.260 0.000 -0.0265 -1.13 
maturity 6888 46.728 25.869 48.000 4197 49.334 25.535 59.000 -2.606*** -5.17 
lc_dummy 7373 0.610 0.488 1.000 4449 0.580 0.494 1.000 0.0301*** 3.24 




Panel C2: Loan Characteristics Classified by High and Low Industry Competition (Median Partition) 
 N Mean Std Median N Mean Std Median Diff in mean t-statistic 
 High competition (Low HHI) Low competition (High HHI) 
Facility Amount 5738 324.493 647.289 125.000 6083 237.733 478.056 100.000 86.76*** 8.32 
AISD 5092 205.592 141.604 200.000 5502 214.710 133.100 200.000 -9.117*** -3.42 
Collateral 5738 0.503 0.500 1.000 6084 0.563 0.496 1.000 -0.0598*** -6.53 
Ncov 5738 11.345 1.242 11.000 6084 11.387 1.281 11.000 -0.0417* -1.79 
Ngencov 5738 10.916 0.277 11.000 6084 10.927 0.260 11.000 -0.0108** -2.20 
Nfincov 5738 0.429 1.210 0.000 6084 0.460 1.252 0.000 -0.0308 -1.36 
maturity 5358 45.669 26.123 48.000 5727 49.629 25.293 59.000 -3.961*** -8.11 
lc_dummy 5738 0.615 0.487 1.000 6084 0.583 0.493 1.000 0.0325*** 3.61 






Table 4 Effect of Lines of Credit on Firms’ Profit in the Subsequent Year 
This table provides the OLS estimates of the effect of getting a line of credit this year and industry 
competition on firms’ profit next year, controlling for other firm and industry characteristics. The 
dependent variable is profit next year, defined as the borrowing firm’s profit in the subsequent year 
after acquiring the line of credit. The key explanatory variables of interests are Dummy_getlc, 
Log(Sum_LC) and Log(Num_LC). Dummy_getlc is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm has 
taken at least one line of credit in this year. Log(Sum_LC) is total amount of lines of credit acquired 
by the firm in a specific year. Log(Num_LC) is total number of lines of credit acquired by the firm in a 
specific year. HHI is the industry Herfindahl-Hirschman Index calculated as the sum of squared sales-
based market shares of all firms in that 3-digit SIC code industry in a given year using Compustat 
database. CR4 is the sum of the market shares of the four largest firms in that 3-digit SIC industry 
using Compustat database. FitHHI is Herfindahl-Hirschman Index at the three-digit SIC code industry 
level based on Hoberg and Phillips (2010). FitHHI combines Compustat data with Herfindahl data 
from the Commerce Department and employee data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, covers private 
and public firms, and all industries. I also control for other firm and industry level characteristic 
variables. See Appendix for detailed definitions of all variables used in this table. Numbers in the 
parentheses are robust t-statistics corrected for heteroscedasticity with standard errors clustered at firm 







Panel A: Effect of Getting a Line of Credit on Firms’ Profit in the Subsequent Year  
 Dependent Variable: Profit Next Year 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
    
Dummy_getlc 0.014***   
 (3.104)   
Log(sum_LC)  0.030**  
  
 (2.224)  
Log(num_LC)   0.001** 
   (1.974) 
MB -0.036*** -0.036*** -0.036*** 
 (-28.724) (-28.725) (-28.726) 
Leverage -0.175*** -0.175*** -0.175*** 
 (-20.247) (-20.244) (-20.243) 
Log(Assets) 0.067*** 0.067*** 0.067*** 
 (45.291) (45.292) (45.275) 
MB_Ind 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 
 (9.614) (9.613) (9.612) 
ROA_Ind 0.506*** 0.506*** 0.506*** 
 (23.866) (23.875) (23.875) 
Leverage_Ind 0.120*** 0.120*** 0.120*** 
 (6.984) (6.989) (6.988) 
HHI 0.099*** 0.099*** 0.099*** 
 (5.489) (5.494) (5.494) 
Constant -0.381*** -0.381*** -0.381*** 
 (-10.601) (-10.600) (-10.599) 
    
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 116,169 116,169 116,169 
R-squared 0.411 0.411 0.411 
Adj. R-squared 0.411 0.411 0.411 






Panel B: Interaction effect of Industry Competition with Dummy of Lines of Credit  
 Dependent variable: Profit Next Year 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
Dummy_getlc 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.029*** 0.014*** 0.028*** 0.022*** 0.043*** 
 (3.273) (3.103) (4.239) (2.886) (4.362) (4.128) (3.251) 
HHI  0.099*** 0.103***     
  (5.490) (5.542)     
Dummy_getlc*HHI   -0.098***     
   (-2.961)     
CR4    0.079*** 0.083***   
    (4.546) (4.649)   
Dummy_getlc*CR4     -0.106***   
     (-3.278)   
FitHHI      -0.064*** -0.063*** 
      (-5.793) (-5.445) 
Dummy_getlc*fithhi       -0.035* 
       (-1.767) 
MB -0.036*** -0.036*** -0.036*** -0.036*** -0.036*** -0.035*** -0.035*** 
 (-28.801) (-28.723) (-28.719) (-28.127) (-28.123) (-26.176) (-26.173) 
Leverage -0.175*** -0.175*** -0.175*** -0.171*** -0.171*** -0.176*** -0.176*** 
 (-20.263) (-20.247) (-20.247) (-19.528) (-19.528) (-18.169) (-18.169) 
Log(Assets) 0.067*** 0.067*** 0.067*** 0.068*** 0.068*** 0.069*** 0.069*** 
 (45.232) (45.291) (45.292) (45.112) (45.112) (43.401) (43.389) 
MB_Ind 0.024*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 
 (9.277) (9.613) (9.615) (9.352) (9.355) (7.006) (7.002) 
ROA_Ind 0.520*** 0.506*** 0.506*** 0.503*** 0.503*** 0.524*** 0.523*** 
 (24.686) (23.865) (23.859) (23.572) (23.563) (23.309) (23.293) 
Leverage_Ind 0.134*** 0.120*** 0.119*** 0.124*** 0.124*** 0.137*** 0.136*** 
 (7.603) (6.984) (6.965) (7.182) (7.161) (6.754) (6.742) 
Constant -0.346*** -0.381*** -0.382*** -0.378*** -0.378*** -0.273 -0.273 
 (-10.065) (-10.601) (-10.614) (-10.500) (-10.515) (-0.000) (0.001) 
        
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 116,170 116,169 116,169 110,040 110,040 96,015 96,015 
R-squared 0.411 0.411 0.411 0.407 0.407 0.392 0.392 
Adj. R-squared 0.411 0.411 0.411 0.407 0.407 0.392 0.392 





Panel C: Interaction Effect of Industry Competition with Number of Lines of Credit  
 Dependent variable: Profit Next Year 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
Log(num_LC) 0.050*** 0.048*** 0.097*** 0.045*** 0.095*** 0.072*** 0.142*** 
 (3.273) (3.103) (4.239) (2.886) (4.362) (4.128) (3.251) 
HHI  0.099*** 0.103***     
  (5.490) (5.542)     
Log(num_LC)*HHI   -0.326***     
   (-2.961)     
CR4    0.079*** 0.083***   
    (4.546) (4.649)   
Log(num_LC)*CR4     -0.351***   
     (-3.278)   
FitHHI      -0.064*** -0.063*** 
      (-5.793) (-5.445) 
Dummy_getlc*fithhi       -0.116* 
       (-1.767) 
MB -0.036*** -0.036*** -0.036*** -0.036*** -0.036*** -0.035*** -0.035*** 
 (-28.801) (-28.723) (-28.719) (-28.127) (-28.123) (-26.176) (-26.173) 
Leverage -0.175*** -0.175*** -0.175*** -0.171*** -0.171*** -0.176*** -0.176*** 
 (-20.263) (-20.247) (-20.247) (-19.528) (-19.528) (-18.169) (-18.169) 
Log(Assets) 0.067*** 0.067*** 0.067*** 0.068*** 0.068*** 0.069*** 0.069*** 
 (45.232) (45.291) (45.292) (45.112) (45.112) (43.401) (43.389) 
MB_Ind 0.024*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 
 (9.277) (9.613) (9.615) (9.352) (9.355) (7.006) (7.002) 
ROA_Ind 0.520*** 0.506*** 0.506*** 0.503*** 0.503*** 0.524*** 0.523*** 
 (24.686) (23.865) (23.859) (23.572) (23.563) (23.309) (23.293) 
Leverage_Ind 0.134*** 0.120*** 0.119*** 0.124*** 0.124*** 0.137*** 0.136*** 
 (7.603) (6.984) (6.965) (7.182) (7.161) (6.754) (6.742) 
Constant -0.346*** -0.381*** -0.382*** -0.378*** -0.378*** -0.270 -0.268 
 (-10.065) (-10.601) (-10.614) (-10.500) (-10.515) (-0.000) (-0.000) 
        
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 116,170 116,169 116,169 110,040 110,040 96,015 5,342 
R-squared 0.411 0.411 0.411 0.407 0.407 0.392 0.124 
Adj. R-squared 0.411 0.411 0.411 0.407 0.407 0.392 0.118 






Panel D: Interaction Effect of Industry Competition with Amount of Lines of Credit  
 Dependent variable: Profit Next Year 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
Log(Sum_LC) 0.001** 0.001** 0.003*** 0.001* 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.004*** 
 (2.143) (1.972) (3.333) (1.750) (3.405) (3.089) (2.747) 
HHI  0.099*** 0.103***     
  (5.494) (5.530)     
Log(Sum_LC)*HHI   -0.011***     
   (-2.766)     
CR4    0.079*** 0.083***   
    (4.549) (4.636)   
Log(Sum_LC)*CR4     -0.012***   
     (-3.091)   
FitHHI      -0.064*** -0.063*** 
      (-5.791) (-5.454) 
Dummy_getlc*fithhi       -0.004* 
       (-1.650) 
MB -0.036*** -0.036*** -0.036*** -0.036*** -0.036*** -0.035*** -0.035*** 
 (-28.803) (-28.725) (-28.722) (-28.128) (-28.125) (-26.178) (-26.176) 
Leverage -0.175*** -0.175*** -0.175*** -0.171*** -0.171*** -0.176*** -0.176*** 
 (-20.259) (-20.243) (-20.244) (-19.525) (-19.525) (-18.166) (-18.166) 
Log(Assets) 0.067*** 0.067*** 0.067*** 0.068*** 0.068*** 0.069*** 0.069*** 
 (45.216) (45.275) (45.276) (45.097) (45.097) (43.383) (43.370) 
MB_Ind 0.024*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 
 (9.276) (9.612) (9.614) (9.350) (9.353) (7.007) (7.003) 
ROA_Ind 0.521*** 0.506*** 0.506*** 0.503*** 0.503*** 0.524*** 0.524*** 
 (24.696) (23.875) (23.868) (23.581) (23.571) (23.319) (23.303) 
Leverage_Ind 0.134*** 0.120*** 0.120*** 0.124*** 0.124*** 0.137*** 0.136*** 
 (7.608) (6.988) (6.971) (7.188) (7.167) (6.759) (6.747) 
Constant -0.346*** -0.381*** -0.381*** -0.378*** -0.378*** -0.274 -0.276 
 (-10.062) (-10.599) (-10.610) (-10.497) (-10.511) (-0.01.) (-0.000) 
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Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 116,170 116,169 116,169 110,040 110,040 96,015 96,015 
R-squared 0.411 0.411 0.411 0.407 0.407 0.392 0.392 
Adj. R-squared 0.411 0.411 0.411 0.407 0.407 0.392 0.392 





Table 5 Effect of Industry Competition on Industry Total Number and Amount of Lines of Credit 
This table provides regression result of the effect of industry competition on the total number and amount of originated lines of credit in that 
industry (corrected for heteroscedasticity and clustering), controlling for other industry level characteristics. The dependent variable in Panel A is 
Number of Lines of Credit acquired per firm, defined as the total number of lines of credit taken by all the firms in that industry in a specific year 
scaled by the total number of firms in that industry. And the dependent variable in Panel B is Logarithm of Amount of Lines of Credit acquired per 
firm, which is the logarithm of the dollar amount of lines of credit loans taken by all the firms in that industry in a specific year scaled by total 
number of firms in that industry.  The key explanatory variable of interests is HHI, which is the industry Herfindahl-Hirschman Index calculated 
as the sum of squared sales-based market shares of all firms in that 3-digit SIC code industry in a given year using Compustat database. CR4 is the 
sum of the market shares of the four largest firms in that 3-digit SIC industry using Compustat database. FitHHI is Herfindahl-Hirschman Index at 
the three-digit SIC code industry level based on Hoberg and Phillips (2010). FitHHI combines Compustat data with Herfindahl data from the 
Commerce Department and employee data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, covers private and public firms, and all industries. The regressions 
also include other industry level control variables. See Appendix for detailed definitions of all variables used in this table. All independent 
variables as measured of the quarter prior to the loan start date. Numbers in the parentheses are robust t-statistics corrected for heteroscedasticity 













Panel A: Industry Total Number of Lines of Credit Acquired per Firm 
 Dependent variable: Number of Lines of Credit acquired per firm 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
    
HHI 2.213***   
 (6.803)   
CR4  2.109***  
  (6.784)  
FitHHI   0.064 
   (0.306) 
MB_ind -0.071** -0.070** -0.057* 
 (-2.036) (-1.990) (-1.765) 
ROA_ind 0.598* 0.613** 0.390 
 (1.967) (2.004) (1.507) 
Leverage_ind 0.033 0.042 0.099 
 (0.170) (0.218) (0.529) 
Sale_gr_ind 0.060 0.058 0.218** 
 (0.561) (0.546) (2.093) 
Ave total assets 0.041 0.040 0.177* 
 (1.229) (1.150) (1.831) 
Constant 0.899*** 0.953*** -1.000*** 
 (3.709) (4.016) (-5.065) 
    
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5,055 4,991 3,348 
R-squared 0.399 0.402 0.398 
Adj. Rsq 0.364 0.367 0.357 





Panel B: Logarithm of Industry Total Dollar Amount of Lines of Credit Acquired per Firm 
 Dependent variable: Logarithm of Amount of Lines of Credit acquired per firm 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
    
HHI -0.572   
 (-0.597)   
CR4  -0.546  
  (-0.584)  
FitHHI   1.041 
   (0.748) 
MB_ind -0.059 -0.075 -0.152 
 (-0.390) (-0.492) (-0.697) 
ROA_ind -0.210 -0.289 1.683 
 (-0.155) (-0.213) (1.052) 
Leverage_ind 0.546 0.577 1.236 
 (0.608) (0.639) (1.153) 
Sale_gr_ind 1.143** 1.124** 2.063*** 
 (2.324) (2.267) (3.236) 
Ave total assets -0.068 -0.087 0.078 
 (-0.739) (-0.938) (0.333) 
Constant 13.123*** 13.070*** -8.010*** 
 (14.818) (14.903) (-7.005) 
    
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5,055 4,991 3,348 
R-squared 0.593 0.589 0.556 
Adj. Rsq 0.570 0.565 0.526 




Table 6 Effect of Industry Concentration on Loan Contract Terms of Lines of 
Credit 
This table provides the OLS estimates of the effect of industry concentration on loan contract 
terms (corrected for heteroscedasticity and clustering), controlling for other industry level 
characteristics. The dependent variable in Panel A is AISD (All In Spread-Drawn), which is the 
all-inclusive cost of a drawn loan to the borrower. This equals the coupon spread over LIBOR on 
the drawn amount plus the annual fee and is reported in basis points. The dependent variable is 
Logarithm of Loan Amount in Panel B, and collateral dummy in Panel C. Logistic regression is 
used in Panel C to estimate the effect of industry concentration on the likelihood of collateral 
requirement in lines of credit loans. The key explanatory variable of interests is HHI, which is the 
industry Herfindahl-Hirschman Index calculated as the sum of squared sales-based market shares 
of all firms in that 3-digit SIC code industry in a given year using Compustat database. CR4 is the 
sum of the market shares of the four largest firms in that 3-digit SIC industry using Compustat 
database. FitHHI is Herfindahl-Hirschman Index at the three-digit SIC code industry level based 
on Hoberg and Phillips (2010). FitHHI combines Compustat data with Herfindahl data from the 
Commerce Department and employee data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, covers private 
and public firms, and all industries. We also control for loan facility characteristics, borrower 
level characteristics and industry level characteristic variables. See Appendix for detailed 
definitions of all variables used in this table. All independent variables as measured of the year 
prior to the loan start date. For Panel A and Panel B, the numbers in the parentheses below the 
coefficient estimates are robust t-statistics corrected for heteroscedasticity with standard error 
clustered at firm level. For Panel C, the numbers in the parentheses below the coefficient 
estimates are robust z-statistics corrected for heteroscedasticity with standard error clustered at 
firm level. (*** Significant at one percent level, ** Significant at five percent level,*Significant 




Panel A: Effect of Industry Concentration on Loan Spread Charged on Lines of Credit 
 Dependent variable: Loan Spread Charged on Lines of Credit 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
HHI -48.807*** -41.497***     
 (-3.872) (-3.261)     
CR4   -35.051*** -29.331**   
   (-2.929) (-2.415)   
FitHHI     -14.744** -8.138 
     (-2.098) (-1.081) 
Collateral 73.087*** 72.276*** 70.091*** 69.398*** 72.506*** 71.777*** 
 (20.199) (19.991) (18.867) (18.668) (17.269) (16.966) 
Log(loan size) -21.505*** -21.342*** -22.156*** -21.947*** -22.010*** -22.315*** 
 (-11.923) (-11.831) (-11.846) (-11.744) (-10.317) (-10.358) 
Log(maturity) -0.868 -0.924 0.119 0.067 -3.419 -3.607 
 (-0.342) (-0.366) (0.047) (0.026) (-1.127) (-1.199) 
MB  -6.791*** -9.143*** -8.753*** -10.827*** -8.652*** -11.148*** 
 (-2.780) (-3.630) (-3.683) (-4.470) (-3.310) (-4.111) 
Leverage 83.954*** 88.698*** 79.164*** 84.157*** 90.000*** 94.189*** 
 (7.422) (7.698) (7.106) (7.368) (7.027) (7.185) 
Log(assets) -14.441*** -14.339*** -14.362*** -14.269*** -14.066*** -14.057*** 
 (-8.848) (-8.786) (-8.420) (-8.361) (-7.064) (-6.944) 
Z-score -3.531*** -3.020*** -3.230*** -2.757*** -2.532** -2.034* 
 (-3.665) (-3.117) (-3.346) (-2.859) (-2.443) (-1.948) 
MB_Ind  2.218  1.173  2.399 
  (1.200)  (0.624)  (1.100) 
ROA_Ind  -25.563  -30.529*  -23.441 
  (-1.634)  (-1.871)  (-1.360) 
Leverage_Ind  4.733  0.545  0.906 
  (0.404)  (0.047)  (0.064) 
Constant 674.769*** 665.965*** 682.600*** 677.849*** 648.673*** 627.365*** 
 (13.773) (13.557) (13.861) (13.729) (14.811) (19.519) 
       
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5,036 5,036 4,712 4,712 3,733 3,733 
R-squared 0.534 0.537 0.535 0.537 0.544 0.543 
Adj. R-squared 0.530 0.534 0.531 0.534 0.540 0.539 






Panel B: Effect of Industry Concentration on Loan Amount Granted 
 Dependent variable: Logarithm of Loan Amount 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
HHI 0.499*** 0.448***     
 (4.345) (3.797)     
CR4   0.539*** 0.479***   
   (4.446) (3.852)   
FitHHI     0.183** 0.130* 
     (2.574) (1.738) 
Collateral -0.076* -0.073* -0.066 -0.063 -0.113** -0.108** 
 (-1.887) (-1.818) (-1.574) (-1.504) (-2.378) (-2.287) 
Log(maturity) 0.409*** 0.405*** 0.432*** 0.428*** 0.410*** 0.404*** 
 (15.295) (15.219) (15.508) (15.501) (13.527) (13.428) 
MB  0.054** 0.062** 0.058** 0.066** 0.009 0.024 
 (2.140) (2.352) (2.196) (2.430) (0.309) (0.826) 
Leverage 0.048 -0.004 0.037 -0.016 0.130 0.076 
 (0.475) (-0.037) (0.352) (-0.151) (1.218) (0.688) 
Log(assets) 0.689*** 0.688*** 0.688*** 0.687*** 0.702*** 0.702*** 
 (46.319) (46.061) (44.648) (44.477) (43.265) (42.948) 
Z-score 0.012 0.010 0.010 0.007 0.021* 0.018 
 (1.137) (0.930) (0.898) (0.678) (1.863) (1.618) 
MB_Ind  0.022  0.022  0.003 
  (1.115)  (1.088)  (0.142) 
ROA_Ind  0.400***  0.430***  0.369** 
  (2.771)  (2.879)  (2.254) 
Leverage_Ind  0.182  0.180  0.130 
  (1.512)  (1.482)  (0.971) 
Constant 11.823*** 11.716*** 11.716*** 11.608*** 11.821*** 11.799*** 
 (39.286) (38.189) (38.324) (37.454) (26.446) (26.113) 
       
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5,327 5,327 4,990 4,990 3,951 3,951 
R-squared 0.715 0.715 0.708 0.709 0.730 0.731 
Adj. R-squared 0.713 0.713 0.707 0.707 0.728 0.728 





Panel C: Effect of Industry Concentration on Loan Collateral Imposed 
 Dependent variable: Loan Collateral Imposed on Lines of Credit 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
HHI -0.832** -0.683*     
 (-2.285) (-1.847)     
CR4   -0.618* -0.509   
   (-1.760) (-1.423)   
FitHHI     -0.188 -0.084 
     (-0.825) (-0.364) 
Log(loan size) -0.105** -0.100* -0.094* -0.088 -0.159** -0.152** 
 (-1.971) (-1.847) (-1.690) (-1.567) (-2.458) (-2.333) 
Log(maturity) 0.577*** 0.578*** 0.566*** 0.567*** 0.531*** 0.538*** 
 (8.029) (8.025) (7.536) (7.526) (5.796) (5.867) 
MB  -0.098 -0.163** -0.143** -0.204*** -0.068 -0.120 
 (-1.473) (-2.379) (-2.074) (-2.864) (-0.881) (-1.527) 
Leverage 1.284*** 1.425*** 1.172*** 1.307*** 1.190*** 1.279*** 
 (4.818) (5.196) (4.484) (4.837) (4.082) (4.240) 
Log(assets) -0.626*** -0.622*** -0.645*** -0.642*** -0.609*** -0.615*** 
 (-11.714) (-11.516) (-11.478) (-11.320) (-9.681) (-9.717) 
Z-score -0.062** -0.053** -0.057** -0.047* -0.070** -0.064** 
 (-2.375) (-2.009) (-2.163) (-1.797) (-2.392) (-2.197) 
MB_Ind  0.149***  0.128**  0.144** 
  (2.753)  (2.322)  (2.309) 
ROA_Ind  0.090  -0.009  0.185 
  (0.226)  (-0.021)  (0.401) 
Leverage_Ind  -0.329  -0.261  -0.161 
  (-1.053)  (-0.820)  (-0.438) 
Constant 4.739*** 4.473*** 4.742*** 4.486*** 3.188*** 2.812*** 
 (4.342) (4.066) (4.221) (3.970) (3.135) (2.689) 
       
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5,327 5,327 4,990 4,990 3,951 3,951 
Pseudo R-squared 0.212 0.215 0.213 0.216 0.222 0.224 





Table 7 Robustness Check using Instrumental Variable Approach: Lines of Credit and Firm Profit 
This table presents the instrumental variable analysis result of the effect of lines of credit on firms’ profit next year.  
The dependent variables in stage 1 include Log(Sum_LC) and Log(Num_LC). Log(Sum_LC) is total amount of lines of credit acquired by the 
firm in a specific year. Log(Num_LC) is total number of lines of credit acquired by the firm in a specific year. The dependent variable in stage 2 is 
profit next year, defined as the borrowing firm’s profit in the subsequent year after acquiring the line of credit. The instrument variable is lending 
relationship, defined as the proportion of total amount of relationship loans out of the total amount of all types of loans taken by the borrower in 
past 3 years. The regressions also control for year and industry fixed effect. See Appendix for detailed definitions of all variables used in this table. 
Numbers in the parentheses are robust t-statistics for heteroscedasticity with standard error clustered at firm level. (*** Significant at one percent 




 Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 1 Stage 2 
VARIABLES Dummy_getlc Profit Next Year Log(Sum_LC) Profit Next Year Log(Num_LC) Profit Next Year 
       
Lending Relationship 0.319***  0.579***  0.020***  
 (5.165)  (5.422)  (5.169)  
Dummy_getlc  0.305***     
  (2.998)     
Log(Sum_LC)    0.036***   
    (3.060)   
Log(Num_LC)      1.014*** 
      (2.998) 
MB -0.016 0.001 -0.009 0.001 -0.000 0.001 
  (-0.828) (0.135) (-0.383) (0.113) (-0.488) (0.135) 
Leverage 0.175** -0.069*** 0.363*** -0.069*** 0.013*** -0.069*** 
  (2.357) (-3.871) (3.429) (-3.892) (3.109) (-3.871) 
Log(Total Assets) 0.344*** -0.001 0.616*** -0.003 0.021*** -0.001 
  (20.089) (-0.169) (23.500) (-0.311) (21.661) (-0.169) 
mkttobook_Ind 0.070** 0.006 0.105** 0.007 0.004** 0.006 
  (2.383) (1.277) (2.213) (1.366) (2.290) (1.277) 
ROA_ind 0.770*** 0.160*** 1.085*** 0.163*** 0.042*** 0.160*** 
  (3.315) (4.469) (2.964) (4.635) (3.041) (4.469) 
Leverage_Ind 0.118 0.058** 0.118 0.059** 0.005 0.058** 
  (0.711) (2.492) (0.437) (2.545) (0.531) (2.492) 
HHI -0.048 0.001 -0.113 0.000 -0.005 0.001 
 (-0.306) (0.025) (-0.441) (0.000) (-0.478) (0.025) 
Constant -4.006*** 0.037 -2.804*** 0.045 -0.091*** 0.037 
 (-12.860) (0.747) (-5.938) (0.886) (-5.257) (0.747) 
       
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 10,092 8,343 10,093 8,343 10,093 8,343 
R-squared 0.085 0.553 0.122 0.487 0.103 0.553 
Adj. R-squared 0.085 0.559 0.119 0.494 0.100 0.559 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses (Standard error clustered at firm level) 
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Table 8 Robustness Check using Quasi Natural Experiment: Industry Competition 
and Firm Profit  
This table presents multivariate regression results on the interaction effect of industry competition 
and acquisition of lines of credit on firms’ profit next year, using large reductions of import tariff 
rate as a quasi-natural experiment to proxy for sudden increase in competition. Following Valta 
(2012), large tariff reduction is identified if the largest tariff rate reduction is larger than three 
times the mean tariff rate reduction in that industry. Post_tariff_reduction =1 if the observation 
post-dates a large tariff reduction. See Appendix for detailed definitions of all variables used in 
this table. All independent variables as measured of the quarter prior to the loan start date. 
Numbers in the parentheses are robust t-statistics for heteroscedasticity with standard error 
clustered at firm level. (*** Significant at one percent level, ** Significant at five percent level,* 




Panel A: Interaction Effect of Tariff Reduction and Dummy for Lines of Credit 
 Dependent Variable: Profit Next Year 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
    
Dummy_getlc 0.012*** 0.020*** -0.006 
  
(2.650) (2.674) (-0.508) 
Post_tariff_reduction   -0.028*** -0.029*** 
  
 (-3.105) (-3.181) 
Dummy_getlc*Post_tariff_reduction    0.036** 
  
  (2.576) 
mkttobook -0.035*** -0.035*** -0.035*** 
  
(-28.176) (-20.391) (-20.392) 
Leverage -0.170*** -0.191*** -0.191*** 
  
(-19.749) (-15.109) (-15.108) 
Log(Total Assets) 0.075*** 0.076*** 0.076*** 
  
(46.786) (34.987) (34.986) 
MB_Ind 0.020*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 
  
(7.216) (6.180) (6.173) 
ROA_Ind 0.511*** 0.530*** 0.530*** 
  
(18.905) (12.752) (12.745) 
Leverage_Ind 0.195*** 0.221*** 0.221*** 
  
(9.960) (7.209) (7.218) 
HHI 0.092*** 0.113*** 0.112*** 
 (3.226) (2.998) (2.987) 
Constant -0.437*** -0.445*** -0.445*** 
 (-20.551) (-14.029) (-14.024) 
    
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 116,169 56,108 56,108 
R-squared 0.417 0.425 0.425 
Adj. R-squared 0.416 0.424 0.424 





Panel B: Interaction Effect of Tariff Reduction and Number of Lines of Credit 
 Dependent Variable: Profit Next Year 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
    
Log(Num_LC) 0.040*** 0.065*** -0.021 
  
(2.650) (2.674) (-0.508) 
Post_tariff_reduction   -0.028*** -0.029*** 
  
 (-3.105) (-3.181) 
Log(Num_LC)*Post_tariff_reduction    0.120** 
  
  (2.576) 
mkttobook -0.035*** -0.035*** -0.035*** 
  
(-28.176) (-20.391) (-20.392) 
Leverage -0.170*** -0.191*** -0.191*** 
  
(-19.749) (-15.109) (-15.108) 
Log(Total Assets) 0.075*** 0.076*** 0.076*** 
  
(46.786) (34.987) (34.986) 
MB_Ind 0.020*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 
  
(7.216) (6.180) (6.173) 
ROA_Ind 0.511*** 0.530*** 0.530*** 
  
(18.905) (12.752) (12.745) 
Leverage_Ind 0.195*** 0.221*** 0.221*** 
  
(9.960) (7.209) (7.218) 
HHI 0.092*** 0.113*** 0.112*** 
 (3.226) (2.998) (2.987) 
Constant -0.437*** -0.445*** -0.445*** 
 (-20.551) (-14.029) (-14.024) 
    
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 116,169 56,108 56,108 
R-squared 0.417 0.425 0.425 
Adj. R-squared 0.416 0.424 0.424 





Panel C: Interaction Effect of Tariff Reduction and Amount of Lines of Credit 
 Dependent Variable: Profit Next Year 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
    
Log(Sum_LC) 0.001 0.002* -0.001 
  
(1.568) (1.865) (-0.956) 
Post_tariff_reduction   -0.028*** -0.029*** 
  
 (-3.111) (-3.183) 
Log(Sum_LC)*Post_tariff_reduction    0.004** 
  
  (2.511) 
mkttobook -0.035*** -0.035*** -0.035*** 
  
(-28.177) (-20.392) (-20.393) 
Leverage -0.170*** -0.191*** -0.191*** 
  
(-19.745) (-15.106) (-15.104) 
Log(Total Assets) 0.075*** 0.076*** 0.076*** 
  
(46.775) (34.976) (34.976) 
MB_Ind 0.020*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 
  
(7.216) (6.186) (6.179) 
ROA_Ind 0.511*** 0.531*** 0.530*** 
  
(18.913) (12.759) (12.750) 
Leverage_Ind 0.195*** 0.221*** 0.221*** 
  
(9.960) (7.210) (7.219) 
HHI 0.092*** 0.113*** 0.112*** 
 (3.230) (3.002) (2.992) 
Constant -0.437*** -0.445*** -0.445*** 
 (-20.547) (-14.026) (-14.022) 
    
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 116,169 56,108 56,108 
R-squared 0.417 0.425 0.425 
Adj. R-squared 0.416 0.424 0.424 







Table 9 Robustness Check using Quasi Natural Experiment: Industry Usage of 
Lines of Credit per Firm  
This table provides regression result of the effect of sudden tariff reduction on the total number 
and amount of originated lines of credit in that industry (corrected for heteroscedasticity and 
clustering), controlling for other industry level characteristics. The dependent variable in model 1 
is Num(LC) per firm, defined as the total number of lines of credit taken by all the firms in that 
industry in a specific year scaled by the total number of firms in that industry. And the dependent 
variable in model 2 is Sum(LC) per firm, which is the amount in billions of dollars of lines of 
credit loans taken by all the firms in that industry in a specific year scaled by total number of 
firms in that industry. The key explanatory variable is post_tariff_reduction. Following Valta 
(2012), large tariff reduction is identified if the largest tariff rate reduction is larger than three 
times the mean tariff rate reduction in that industry. Post_tariff_reduction =1 if the observation 
post-dates a large tariff reduction. The regressions also include other industry level control 
variables. See Appendix for detailed definitions of all variables used in this table. All independent 
variables as measured of the quarter prior to the loan start date. Numbers in the parentheses are 
robust t-statistics corrected for heteroscedasticity with standard errors clustered at industry level.  
(*** Significant at one percent level, ** Significant at five percent level,*Significant at ten 
percent level) 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Num(LC) per firm Sum(LC) per firm 
   
Post_tariff_reduction -0.002 -0.001 
 (-0.266) (-0.182) 
MB_Ind -0.006* -0.001 
 (-1.679) (-0.674) 
ROA_Ind 0.027 0.004 
 (1.032) (0.401) 
Leverage_Ind 0.011 -0.007 
 (0.550) (-1.102) 
Sale_gr_Ind 0.016 0.002 
 (1.191) (0.406) 
Constant 0.003 0.006* 
 (0.789) (1.912) 
   
Year FE Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes 
Observations 2,128 2,128 
R-squared 0.347 0.357 
Adj. R-squared 0.300 0.311 






Table 10 Robustness Check using Quasi Natural Experiment: Univariate Test of Loan Characteristics Before and After 
Sudden Reduction of Import Tariff Rates 
This table presents univariate test results on loan specific characteristics before and after a large reduction of import tariff rates following Valta 
(2012) on Reduction on Tariff Rate. Following Valta (2012), large tariff reduction is identified if the largest tariff rate reduction is larger than three 
times the mean tariff rate reduction in that industry. Post_tariff_reduction =1 if the observation post-dates a large tariff reduction. See Appendix 
for detailed definitions of all variables used in this table. (*** Significant at one percent level, ** Significant at five percent level,*Significant at 
ten percent level) 
Panel A: The Entire Loan Sample 
 N Mean Std Median N Mean Std Median Diff in mean t-statistic 
 Before Tariff Reduction After Tariff Reduction 
Facility Amount 1306 163.873 318.953 51.000 3351 269.279 543.511 100.000 -105.4*** -6.58 
AISD 1151 201.988 129.361 200.000 3037 214.973 141.458 200.000 -12.98*** -2.71 
Collateral 1306 0.557 0.497 1.000 3351 0.549 0.498 1.000 0.00804 0.50 
Ncov 1306 11.571 1.328 11.000 3351 11.335 1.273 11.000 0.237*** 5.63 
Ngencov 1306 10.952 0.214 11.000 3351 10.911 0.284 11.000 0.0404*** 4.65 
Nfincov 1306 0.619 1.316 0.000 3351 0.423 1.242 0.000 0.196*** 4.76 
maturity 1206 45.705 26.325 46.500 3184 47.802 24.788 54.000 -2.097** -2.46 
lc_dummy 1306 0.592 0.492 1.000 3351 0.584 0.493 1.000 0.00818 0.51 
tl_dummy 1306 0.344 0.475 0.000 3351 0.334 0.472 0.000 0.0102 0.66 
 
Panel B: The Lines of Credit Sample 
 N Mean Std Median N Mean Std Median Diff in mean t-statistic 
 Before Tariff Reduction After Tariff Reduction 
Facility Amount 773 211.228 372.465 80.000 1956 313.129 553.299 140.000 -101.9*** -4.72 
AISD 690 164.565 118.957 137.500 1816 167.428 118.837 150.000 -2.863 -0.54 
Collateral 773 0.462 0.499 0.000 1956 0.452 0.498 0.000 0.00938 0.44 
Ncov 773 11.510 1.233 11.000 1956 11.263 1.180 11.000 0.246*** 4.85 
Ngencov 773 10.935 0.246 11.000 1956 10.883 0.321 11.000 0.0519*** 4.05 
Nfincov 773 0.574 1.226 0.000 1956 0.380 1.135 0.000 0.195*** 3.94 




Table 11 Robustness Check using Quasi Natural Experiment: Industry Competition 
and Lines of Credit Contract Terms  
This table presents multivariate regression results on the effect of a large reduction of import 
tariff rates on the loan contract terms of lines of credit loans. OLS results on loan spread charged 
on lines of credit are presented in Panel A. Probit analysis results on loan collateral requirement 
on lines of credit are presented in Panel B, and Panel C provides the result on the loan amount 
granted. Following Valta (2012), large tariff reduction is identified if the largest tariff rate 
reduction is larger than three times the mean tariff rate reduction in that industry. 
Post_tariff_reduction =1 if the observation post-dates a large tariff reduction. See Appendix for 
detailed definitions of all variables used in this table. All independent variables as measured of 
the quarter prior to the loan start date. For Panel A and Panel B, the numbers in the parentheses 
below the coefficient estimates are robust t-statistics corrected for heteroscedasticity with 
standard error clustered at firm level. For Panel C, the numbers in the parentheses below the 
coefficient estimates are robust z-statistics corrected for heteroscedasticity with standard error 
clustered at firm level. (*** Significant at one percent level, ** Significant at five percent 




Panel A: Loan Spread Charged on Lines of Credit  
 Dependent Variable: Loan Spread Charged  
VARIABLES (1) (2) 
   
Post_tariff_reduction 24.694*** 18.649*** 
 (4.999) (3.696) 
Collateral 73.083*** 70.801*** 
 (12.746) (12.698) 
Log(loan size) -22.565*** -21.251*** 
 (-8.369) (-7.951) 
Log(maturity) -9.661*** -9.248*** 
 (-2.803) (-2.769) 
MB -7.324** -12.059*** 
 (-1.993) (-3.251) 
Leverage 78.406*** 93.559*** 
 (4.493) (5.107) 
Log(assets) -13.251*** -14.529*** 
 (-5.396) (-5.965) 
Z-score -3.336** -2.206 
 (-2.345) (-1.572) 
MB_Ind  0.509 
  (0.184) 
ROA_Ind  -78.295*** 
  (-3.611) 
Leverage_Ind  -10.168 
  (-0.613) 
Constant 669.387*** 661.316*** 
 (9.262) (9.004) 
   
Industry FE Yes Yes 
Observations 2,033 2,033 
R-squared 0.563 0.576 
Adj. R-squared 0.559 0.572 




Panel B: Loan Amount Granted on Lines of Credit 
 Dependent variable: Logarithm of Loan Amount 
VARIABLES (1) (2) 
   
Post_tariff_reduction 0.058 0.067 
 (1.189) (1.321) 
Collateral -0.047 -0.034 
 (-0.897) (-0.639) 
Log(maturity) 0.424*** 0.415*** 
 (12.161) (11.897) 
MB 0.023 0.058* 
 (0.666) (1.656) 
Leverage 0.142 0.003 
 (0.999) (0.019) 
Log(assets) 0.720*** 0.720*** 
 (42.011) (39.615) 
Z-score 0.028* 0.021 
 (1.737) (1.316) 
MB_Ind  -0.006 
  (-0.216) 
ROA_Ind  0.539*** 
  (2.755) 
Leverage_Ind  0.450*** 
  (2.774) 
Constant 10.749*** 10.608*** 
 (42.863) (42.089) 
   
Industry FE Yes Yes 
Observations 2,167 2,167 
R-squared 0.765 0.768 
Adj. R-squared 0.763 0.766 





Panel C: Loan Collateral Imposed on Lines of Credit 
 Dependent variable: Collateral Dummy 
VARIABLES (1) (2) 
   
Post_tariff_reduction 0.294** 0.176 
 (2.510) (1.423) 
Log(loan size) -0.059 -0.034 
 (-0.952) (-0.525) 
Log(maturity) 0.477*** 0.461*** 
 (5.672) (5.366) 
MB -0.039 -0.130 
 (-0.440) (-1.399) 
Leverage 1.212*** 1.397*** 
 (3.603) (4.037) 
Log(assets) -0.668*** -0.698*** 
 (-11.546) (-11.600) 
Z-score -0.044 -0.031 
 (-1.254) (-0.877) 
MB_Ind  0.217*** 
  (3.250) 
ROA_Ind  0.229 
  (0.453) 
Leverage_Ind  -0.051 
  (-0.128) 
Constant 5.300*** 3.872*** 
 (4.050) (2.770) 
   
Industry FE Yes Yes 
Observations 2,164 2,164 
Pseudo R-squared 0.215 0.223 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses (Standard error clustered at firm level) 
